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ARTICLES 
GENOCIDE AND THE EROTICIZATION 




A. THE NEXT GENOCIDE: PRACTICAL INVESTMENTS 
As I write this, the world's attention is focused on the war against 
terrorism and the war in Iraq. Somewhere in Africa, a government has 
been accused of aiding and abetting the slaughter of its own people by the 
hundreds and driving thousands of several maligned minorities out of their 
homeland, to face rape and assault by marauding militia (partly government 
sponsored) and the certainty of starvation, suffering, and death at the hands 
of their ~ersecutors. 1 Darfur, Sudan has slowly entered the lexicon of 
genocide, to be added to a list that includes Srebrenica, Kigali, Kosovo, 
and long before these, Auschwitz and Kharput. 
t B.A., M.A., Columbia University; LL.B., University of Toronto; Ph.D., Columbia University. 
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1 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Darfar Destroyed, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports 
/2004/sudan0504 (last visited June 23, 2004). 
The government of Sudan is responsible for 'ethnic cleansing' and crimes against humanity 
in Darfur, one of the world's poorest and most inaccessible regions, on Sudan's western 
border with Chad. The Sudanese government and the Arab 'Janjaweed' militias it arms and 
supports have committed numerous attacks on the civilian populations of the African Fur, 
Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups .... The government and its Janjaweed allies have killed 
thousands of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa-often in cold blood, raped women, and destroyed 
villages, food stocks and other supplies essential to the civilian population. They have 
driven more than one million civilians, mostly farmers, into camps and settlements in Darfur 
where they live on the very edge of survival, hostage to Janjaweed abuses. More than 
110,000 others have fled to neighboring Chad but the vast majority of war victims remain 
trapped in Darfur. 
Diocese of Pueblo, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western 
Sudan, available at http://www.dioceseofpueblo.com/pastorallife/mc/darfur _ destroyed.htm (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2005). 
2 See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Magboula s Brush With Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A23. 
"Ms. Khattar ... part of a wave of 1.2 million people left homeless by the genocide in Darfur." Id. 
181 
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Darfur's entry is typical of modern-day instances of genocide. It 
begins, for us in the West, with what some have called the "semantic 
debate"3: is this really genocide?4 We need to know, because once an event 
is called by that name, it has a definable and recognizable shape and entails 
specific legal duties which include an obligation, on the part of the 
international community, to intervene because of genocide's threat to 
international "peace and security. "5 
The failure and distraction of the semantic debate as a pragmatic 
vehicle for intervention has recently been noted, not least within the 
context of Darfur.6 Nevertheless, the genocide debate may be important for 
another reason: the word carries emotional, moral, and historical weight. It 
is conceivable that Darfur would have remained on the margins of the 
world's consciousness were the events there characterized as "massive 
violations of human rights," in the more clinical language of the United 
Nations.7 Although the word "genocide" may indeed be enervated by its 
application to sundry events that commentators continue to debate8-and 
In July 2004, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution labeling Darfur a genocide. Then, in 
early September, after reviewing the results of an innovative government-sponsored 
investigation, Secretary of State Colin Powell also used the term and President George W. 
Bush followed suit in a speech to the United Nations several weeks later-the first times 
such senior U.S. government officials had ever conclusively applied the term to a current 
crisis and invoked the convention. 
Scott Straus, Darfar and the Genocide Debate, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 123, 123 (Jan./Feb. 2005). 
3 Unnamed Student, Phrase Used in Professor Kathleen Hamill's "International Human Rights Law and 
Policy" course at the Fletcher School at Tufts University in Response to a Panel Discussion Entitled 
"Crisis in Sudan: The Failure to Respond" held on July 7, 2004 at the Kennedy School of Government 
at Harvard University (July 8, 2004). 
4 See, e.g., Marc Lacey, In Darfar. Appalling Atrocity, But Is That Genocide?, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 
2004, atA3. 
5 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 278. 
6 See Straus, supra note 2, at 124. 
Id. 
So far, the convention has proven weak. Having been invoked, it did not-<:ontrary to 
expectations--electrify international efforts to intervene in Sudan. Instead, the UN Security 
Council commissioned further studies ... Darfur has shown that the energy spent fighting 
over whether to call the events there 'genocide' was misplaced, overshadowing difficult but 
more important questions about how to craft an effective response to mass violence against 
civilians in Sudan. 
7 Id. at 130. 
Id. 
Meanwhile, other world leaders and opinion makers continued to show reticence about 
calling Darfur 'genocide.' EU, Canadian, and British officials all avoided the term, as did 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who was pilloried in the media for limiting his 
description of Darfur to 'massive violations of human rights.' Human Rights Watch and the 
Pulitzer Prize-winning author Samantha Power favored the slightly less charged term 'ethnic 
cleansing,' arguing that Darfur involved the forced removal of an ethnic group, not its 
deliberate extermination, and that genocide is hard to prove in the midst of a crisis. 
8 Kosovo is a controversial case in point, where some view NATO's military intervention as justified on 
the basis of curtailing or preventing genocide by the Milosevic government, and others contest the 
application of the term and, as such, the use of force in that instance. See generally ALEXANDER 
COCKBURN & JEFFREY ST. CLAIR, IMPERIAL CRUSADES: IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND YUGOSLAVIA (2004) 
(arguing that the bombs dropped on Serbia and Kosovo had less to do with humanitarianism and more 
with realpolitik). 
It's plain too that the US and its NATO subordinates wanted a confrontation and ultimately 
forced it. It's also clear that increasingly vocal and explicit charges by the Russians that the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was supplied by the Germans and the CIA have merit. The 
KLA itself was roundly denounced-before the bombings-in the London Times as a Maoist 
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althou~h to date the use of the term has not brought about intervention in 
Sudan -it still garners attention, if only for a moment. 
Genocide is a legal term whose deployment carries political, cultural, 
and moral implications. It is a juridical vessel for a number of 
specifications: morality and notions of evil, ethics and the instrumental (or 
political) nature of representation, lived event (what "actually" happened), 
and how things are narrated and remembered (the felt cultural, political, 
and moral needs of the perpetrators and victims, as well as the witnesses). 
As Straus puts it, "Genocide is a contested concept: there is much 
disagreement about what qualifies for the term."10 
Darfur provides two lessons at once: first, as the next genocide, it 
imbibes all the past instances, questions and critiques them, even as it cries 
for direct address in its own specific historical and political context. 
Second, as the next genocide, it irradiates outwards, outside itself, as a 
discourse; when we situate Darfur in the global-historical moment next to 
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Tamil Tigers, Abu Ghraib, and so on, we glimpse an 
understanding of our relationship to what we consider evil, what we "do" 
about it, who receives attention and why, and so on. In short, Darfur 
presses us to think about two related ways of seeing an event: in pragmatic 
or practical terms, and in abstract or philosophical terms. In the first place, 
people are dying: what do we do to stop this from happening, if anything? 
The answer to questions of activity entails the production of practical and 
strategic knowledge. In the second place, people are being killed: what is 
my connection to these events? Who are they to me, and who am I in 
relation to them and their suffering? The answer to questions such as these 
produces speculative and philosophical information. These questions 
attempt to excavate our active and specular investments in relation to their 
suffering and their destruction. 
Activists and practitioners are impatient11 with the questions that 
produce speculative knowledge, holding that to speculate about "being" 
and "existence" while people are being massacred and hounded from their 
homes is distracting or perverse. This is true, even or especially in the 
instant case. Yet, in order to persuade their leaders to act, activists require a 
Id. at 7. 
gang fueled by heroin-trafficking. . . . So the NATO bombs began to fall and, exactly as 
could have been predicted, the Serbian brutalities in Kosovo escalated and the tidal wave of 
refugees began. Everything has gone according to the script. 
9 See Straus, supra note 2, at 131. "The genocide debate and the Darfur crisis are thus instructive for 
several reasons. First, they have made it clear that 'genocide' is not a magic word that triggers 
intervention." Id. 
10 Straus, supra note 2, at 132. Straus continues with a discussion of the two elements that are most 
contested with respect to the meaning of the term: what constitutes the "group" being destroyed (that is 
to say, "how much 'partial' group destruction does it take to reach the genocide threshold?"), and the 
problem of determining the perpetrator's intent "in the midst of a crisis." Id. Whereupon Straus notes, 
"the indeterminacy makes genocide a difficult term around which to mobilize an international coalition 
for intervention." Id. 
11 See, e.g., Samantha Power, Dying in Darfar: Can the Ethnic Cleansing in Sudan be Stopped?, THE 
NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2004, at 56. "In the meantime [whilst states resist calling the crisis in Darfur a 
genocide], the debate over semantics has only further distracted the international community from the 
more important debate about how to save lives." Id. at 72. 
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vehicle that tells the actors it is politically expedient, morally advisable, or 
legally required that they act. In short, they need a theory. My point is that 
when the action is largely, if not exclusively, "contained" in the legal box-
that is, one cannot act, notwithstanding one's moral instinct to the contrary, 
unless one's actions are legal, or arguably (as in the case of Kosovo), unless 
the act can be legitimated (sometimes ex post facto)-then the theory 
behind the legality of action in the face of a genocide becomes critical. 
Genocide, then, is the legal term (derived from international law) that 
enables us to act in the face of massive human suffering. But the law also 
enables us to stand still. This is the substance of the semantic debate: if 
Darfur is defined as a genocide, legally we have a duty to intervene. If not, 
we may stand still and, indeed, as happened in Rwanda, stand down when 
the slaughtering begins. But behind the semantics and the impatience, 
behind the will to intervene or not to intervene, lies a discourse of 
practicality and expediency: is it feasible? Do we have economic or 
political interests at stake? And beneath even this level of address lies 
something else: the peculiar hold of the specular. Herein lurk dark hints 
about ourselves, intimated in that secret sense, barely confessed to 
ourselves and quickly suppressed, that "Those savages are at it again," or "I 
couldn't look at the pictures of these broken children, those raped and 
forlorn women, and yet I couldn't tum away either." The law enables us to 
escape these secret buried hints; in a sense, the law enables an escape from 
ourselves. It is all about those poor, wretched people dying, and the need to 
chide ourselves, through the law, into moral action. 12 
Critiquing the law on genocide involves a risk. People are being killed; 
the object of critique, therefore, should be to produce instrumental 
information that will enable us to act-"what can we do to save them, to 
stop this, today?"13 But I submit that despite the dichotomy between 
practice and theory, both practical and speculative information are, in the 
final analysis, instrumental. How is theory instrumental? When we see 
that the semantic debate is really asking what is reposed within the law, 
what the law as a vessel contains, we realize that it expresses more than 
legal entailments: the law, as the discursive determinant of how we see an 
event, is mythopoeic. It generates and resolves (or attempts to) all those 
ambivalent fears, hopes, and desires in relation to dead bodies and forlorn 
victims. It contains, and therefore quiets, ambiguous political, historical, 
and cultural difficulties. In short, the law as a vessel defines the self in 
relation to the other across the borderline called genocide: how I define 
what is happening to those humans dying in a faraway country defines me 
in relation to them, me as both construct and projection in relation to the 
other. The discourse on genocide, in short, is a project or a myth-system14 
12 See Straus, supra note 2, at 129. "The [Genocide C]onvention had never been tested, however, and 
the law is in fact ambiguous on what 'undertaking to prevent' and 'suppressing' genocide actually mean 
and who is to carry out such measures." Id. 
13 See id. at 124 (describing U.N. commissioned studies and vague threats, which have not proven 
effective in stopping the violence). 
14 Like Edward W. Said's Orienta/ism, the discourse of genocide is "a myth-system with a mytho-logic, 
rhetoric, and institutions of its own. It is a machine for producing statements" about an event in relation 
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that produces knowledge about the self. But when we see the law as 
discursive (as, indeed, the semantic debate), we understand that law as 
repository of self-projection is a means of producing a certain kind of self 
and escaping another: this is a self defined according to whether or not she 
does or does not have legal duties. The self as ambivalent, 15 torn, 
discordant, opaque, is resolved in the clarity of the rational, juridical self. 
But how is knowledge of the self that is elucidated by a critique of the 
law "instrumental" in terms of what to do about the dying out there? I 
suggest that critique allows us to see that escaping from the self is also a 
means of escaping from a view of the self implicated in those actions far 
away, as somehow invested in the death and depredation "out there." In 
other words, the critical project is instrumental because if we are really 
interested in saving lives, in doing something, not just in the instant case-
and the instant case is always too late, always peripheral-but also in the 
future, then we need to move beyond the (borderline of) innocence16 vested 
in us by the juridical self, which essentially casts us in the role of 
bystanders engaged in a semantic debate, or saviors intervening to rescue 
both lives and consciences. But investment in the life of the other means, 
in effect, that the self must excavate and confront the deep, conflicted and, 
indeed, largely unconscious desire for the destruction of the other. The self 
confronts the sense that that destruction (thanatos) is a febrile, sacramental 
and, I will argue, erotic engine and source of the self's creative project 
(eros). 
Thus, to the practitioner's impatient question concerning Darfur: "What 
can we do to save lives now, today?" one must also add another question: 
Will the deployment of any of the practical options at hand (get the UN 
involved, get the lawyers and the military on standby) ensure that if there is 
another Darfur I will be able to ask, "What can I do to save lives now, 
today?" In other words, what is our investment in genocide? 
B. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
The object of this Article is to look more closely at the discourse on 
genocide, the juridical narrative that has been created around instances of 
mass violence that have involved the application of the term as a legal 
referent. Stated simply, my purpose in critiquing the discourse on genocide 
is to engender a disinvestment in the death of others. I analyze the 
discourse as a form of conflict management at two levels of investment: the 
to, and regardless of its ultimate definition as, genocide. POWER, POLITICS, AND CULTURE: INTERVIEWS 
WITH EDWARD W. SAID 36 (Gauri Viswanathan ed., 2001) [hereinafter SAID]. 
15 See generally DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (2004). See infra Part II.A and note 48 for a discussion of Kennedy's stories of 
moral ambivalence, uncertainty, and "resolution" within narrative. 
16 I use the term "border(s) of innocence" as a metaphor to denote how discourse, particularly of the law 
(the juridical), functions in part to create a severance between the self, the one that sits in judgment, the 
one observing and constructing the object or event, and the other or the event itself. "Innocence" 
suggests both my non-complicity in the event (violence of the other), as well as my naivete, 
bewilderment, and incomprehension when faced with the annihilatory violence of the other, i.e., its 
foreignness to me. This "border" is a construct (cordon sanitaire) driven in part by a deep and libidinal 
(desiring) will to moral purity, as I discuss in this Article. 
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individual and the state. Pursuant to a prescription for Darfur today, or 
indeed for what we could or should have done in Kosovo or Nyarubuye 
yesterday, I hope to provide in the following pages a reflection on what we 
mean by genocide, what investments are involved, how we have 
constructed our narratives, our world, such that these investments and their 
tenebrous consequences seem inevitable and inescapable, how we appear to 
ourselves to be powerless in the face of rampant death and destruction out 
there in the world. By extension, I posit a critique of a legal system and 
legal/political prescriptions that render our narrative of genocide stable and 
inevitable. 
To be sure, we suffer when we see photograp!is of the victims, ravaged 
and emaciated. But that's the point: as Slavoj Zizek has noted, we hold 
different libidinal investments between suffering "here" and suffering 
"there," suggesting that the latter is represented as more real, in a sense, 
and therefore more necessary. 17 The nameless Japanese man in Alain 
Resnais's Hiroshima Mon Amour18 makes a similar point to his lover, the 
nameless French woman, who believes she knows Hiroshima from what 
she has seen (e.g., hospitals, museums, Peace Square, newsreels)-"! saw 
everything. Everythin&." He replies, over and over, "You saw nothing in 
Hiroshima. Nothing." 
Almost daily we are fed a diet of images of ravaged and emaciated 
victims of crises somewhere else, in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, or South 
America, and we think we see "everything," that we know ourselves 
through and against these images. My point will be that within such stories 
are intimated the creation of the borders between self and other that make 
the other's destruction seem insoluble, render my pity and horror futile, and 
justify, indeed require, my redemptive intervention (use of force). 
But I will also argue that the question of our libidinal investment is not 
the creation of the border itself; on the contrary, a borderless world, after 
all, is a world gone mad.20 Borders, as Miroslav Volf notes, can also be 
17 See SLAVOJ ZIZEK, WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL! FIVE ESSAYS ON SEPTEMBER 11 AND 
RELATED DATES 13 (2002). 
Id. 
And the same 'derealization' [as in The Truman Show] of the horror went on after the WTC 
collapse: while the number of victims-3,000--is repeated all the time, it is surprising how 
little of the actual carnage we see-no dismembered bodies, no blood, no desperate faces of 
dying people ... in clear contrast to reporting on Third World catastrophes, where the whole 
point is to produce a scoop of some gruesome detail: Somalis dying of hunger, raped 
Bosnian women, men with their throats cut. These shots are always accompanied by an 
advance warning that 'some of the images you will see are extremely graphic and may upset 
children'-a warning which we never heard in the reports on the WTC collapse. Is this not 
yet further proof of how, even in this tragic moment, the distance which separates Us from 
Them, from their reality, is maintained: the real horror happens there, not here? 
18 HIROSHIMA MON AMOUR (Criterion Collection 1959). 
19 Id. This is during the long sequence at the beginning of the film. With respect to newsreels, she says, 
inter alia: "The films have been made as authentically as possible. The illusion, it's quite simple, the 
illusion is so perfect that the tourists cry. One can always scoff, but what else can a tourist do, really, 
but cry? I've always wept over the fate of Hiroshima. Always." He says, "No. What would you have 
cried about?" Later, interrupting her monologue on the films, "You saw nothing. Nothing." 
20 MIROSLAV VOLF, EXCLUSION & EMBRACE: A THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION OF IDENTITY, OTHERNESS, 
AND RECONCILIATION 90-91 (1996). "The formation and negotiation of identity always entails the 
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bridges to the other. Within the discourse on genocide, which is all about 
destruction, lies the possibility that the very thing that separates us from 
them-that requires us to see their suffering and to see it as more real and, 
as such, as the limit of my self-extension (in an act of redemption, saving 
them)-also unites us. The analysis becomes, in short, a function of 
reconceptualizing the borders themselves. 
The borders of innocence are the narratives and ways of seeing that 
constitute the discourse on genocide. What is evil, and who am I in relation 
to it? In the following, I will suggest that the discourse is a means of 
managing the world and categorizing the humans within it. 
In discussing the Nazi program of extermination, Alain Badiou notes 
that whereas evil exists, "there is no radical Evil."21 Evil as "a category not 
of the human animal, but of the subject," he explains, must be understood 
with reference to "the intrinsic dimensions of the process of political 
truth."22 As such, evil is taken out of conceptions of natural law (biology), 
as well as divorced from its "obviously religious origins.'m This is not to 
deny the singularity of the Holocaust, but rather "to situate [localiser] this 
singularity" within human history and subjectivity.24 
David Kennedy describes what happens to the situatedness of events 
within certain narratives. Although the story he tells concerns the alleged 
abuse of political prisoners by the Uruguayan government in the 1980s, it is 
illustrative of the discursive mechanisms applicable to any human rights 
event, including events described as genocide. 
Kennedy and his colleagues first meet a prison warden named Papillon, 
then the prisoner, a woman named Ana. In reporting on these meetings, 
Kennedy struggles with their meaning as situated narrative: "I could tell a 
story about 'humm1 rights abuses in Uruguay and the work of private 
institutions to combat them,'" he begins, suggesting also a situatedness 
having to do with "the rhythmic ebb and flow of the rule of law," or "[t]he 
process of Uruguayan 'democratization,"' or "a narrative about social 
struggle or foreign relations. "25 Then Kennedy notes the following: 
For all this potential narrative variety, however, it seems that no 
matter which story I tell, our moment with Ana is bound to be 
rendered too lucid, its own ambiguity lost to history. The difficulty 
is that both the analysis and the activism respond to narrative 
demands. Both enterprises struggle against the confusion of 
moments like ours with Ana, continuously creating new 
ambiguities and confusions. Although one point of a story like this 
one is to remember what was put aside in our moment with Ana, 
drawing of boundaries, the setting of the self as distinct from the other. As Gillian Rose puts it in Loves 
Work, 'a soul that is unbound is as mad as one with cemented borders."' Id. 
21 ALAIN BADIOU ETHICS: AN UNDERSTANDING OF EVIL 66 (Peter Hallward trans., Verso 2001). 
22 Id. at 66. 
23 Id. at 58. 
24 Id. at 64. "One of the singularities of Nazi politics was its precise proclamation of the historical 
community that was to be endowed with a conquering subjectivity. And it was this proclamation that 
enabled its subjective victory, and put extermination on the agenda." Id. at 65. 
25 KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 40. 
HeinOnline -- 14 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 188 2004-2005
188 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 14: 181 
the telling reinforces a deeper social practice of conflict 
management: we defer coming to terms with the confusion of the 
moment by embroidering it into the fabric of numerous comforting 
stories.26 
As Kennedy's analysis of the "dark side" of humanitarianism suggests, 
if the "ordinary" human rights event is ambiguous and confusing, such that 
it is situated "by embroidering it into the fabric of numerous comforting 
stories,"27 now much more will this be true of a massive program of 
extermination, such as the Nazi Holocaust or the Rwandan and Bosnian 
genocides? It is at the point of the situatedness of an event within a 
narrative of desire and suppression, management and deflection, that I wish 
to posit an analogy. I suggest a parallel operation, regarding what Kennedy 
terms the "narrative demands" that reinforce the "deeper social practice of 
conflict management," between the individual, psychic level on the one 
hand, and on the other, the "management" of sovereignty (the sovereign 
self) by the state within, by and through the international legal system. 28 
The similarity between the two-individual and state-revolves around 
the function of law as the repository of a narrative, if you will, of stability, a 
"comforting story" of rationality and safety. This is the content of the 
"semantic debate" regarding genocide as a juridical discourse. The law, for 
both self and sovereign, manages the ambiguities and reinforces the social 
practice of conflict management. For the self, the law does this by 
containing (and resolving) the duty of moral action or inaction in the face 
of the other's suffering; the law alienates the self from that suffering, in 
part through the specular fixation on suffering as other. To understand a 
similar operation of the law at the level of the state, one must recall the idea 
or conceptualization of sovereignty as both dichotomized and 
contradictory. As Martti Koskenniemi explains it, "modem doctrine 
constantly oscillates between an ascending and a descending perspective on 
statehood; "29 that is, the choice between a conception of sovereignty as 
either before or after the law. To grossly simplify a complex problem: if 
the sovereign comes after the law (law anterior to the sovereign), then the 
law "manages" and constrains the sovereign, including as such the political 
will, which itself includes the sovereign's appetite for imperialism. If, on 
the other hand, the state as sovereign is anterior to the law, then the 
international legal system is in effect the will of the state, spoken by it. In 
any event, under either theory, it may be posited that a state will perceive 
itself, qua the imperialist appetite (non-equality of states or, simply, the 
question of power), as either constrained by or constraining the rule of law 
(international legal system). There is an inevitable enmeshment between 
26 Id. 
21 Id. 
28 See id. 
29 MARITI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 193 (1989). Koskenniemi also refers to the "mutual exclusivity" of these two conceptions 
as empiricism versus conceptualism, the "legal approach" (sovereign under law) versus the "pure fact 
approach" (law ultimately the will of the sovereign), with Hans Kelsen, the principal advocate of the 
former (the "utopianism" in the title of Koskenniemi's book), and Carl Schmitt, the advocate of the 
latter (the "apologism," i.e., for state power as the ultimate "source of validity"). See id. at 194-200. 
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sovereignty and law, but even if the question of the relationship cannot be 
resolved by resort to either theory of sovereignty, the choice of one 
perspective over another will have consequences for the situatedness of the 
political, extrinsic event. Calling an event genocide, then, implicates the 
sovereignty of the redemptive and the recalcitrant states in question. 
Genocide, then, involves the issue of conflict management at two 
levels. Analogous to the individual confronted with the trauma of the 
external event-managed by a narrative of juridical alienation from the 
violence and displacement of the self's own aggressivity as other (libidinal 
or erotic investment), the juridical is also the site of the state's stability 
when its sovereignty is under threat (i.e., external crisis as a threat or crisis 
with respect to international peace and security). If, then, the international 
arena is characterized by what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the 
"omni-crisis,"30 then this must involve both the threat to and stabilization 
(ratification) of the sovereign, i.e., the meaning of sovereignty within the 
redemptive act. In a sense, then, both individual psyche as a "subject" of 
the self, and sovereignty as the state's subjectivity under or through 
international law, are invested in systemic crisis as both materially and 
discursively exteriorized. 
As Kennedy notes, juridical narrative as an instance of conflict 
management-of ambivalent psychic projections as much as imperialist 
drives or hungers-both creates the ambivalences it attem}?ts to resolve and 
reinforces the tracks or the patterns of management. The juridical 
narrative, therefore, coheres with an idea of imperialism itself as 
functionally a cycle of the creation and resolution of conflict. As Hardt and 
Negri point out in their discussion of the "new" post-imperial or modem 
sovereign, "the expansion of Empire is rooted in the internal trajectory of 
the conflicts it is meant to resolve."32 Hardt and Negri go on to point out 
that "[t]he first task of Empire, then, is to enlarge the realm of the 
consensuses that support its power. "33 
Thus, if we agree with modem theorists that the nature and extent of 
the widespread conflicts throughout the world since the end of the Cold 
War have inaugurated a new kind of superpower sovereignty, whereby the 
United States is called upon to exercise the law, or to manage conflicts 
either pursuant to or regardless of the law (the "state of exception"34 that 
permits the sovereign under threat to suspend the law, and in a sense to 
30 See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 189 (2000). "The end of the crisis of modernity 
has given rise to a proliferation of minor and indefinite crises, or, as we prefer, to an omni-crisis." Id. 
31 See generally KENNEDY, supra note 15. 
32 HARDT & NEGRJ, supra note 30, at 15. 
33 Id. 
34 See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 
(George Schwab trans., MIT 1985) (1922). "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. Only this 
definition can do justice to a borderline concept." Id. See also Giorgio Agamben, Generation Online, 
The State of Emergency, at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpagambenschmitt.htm (last visited Oct. 
29, 2004). Agamben notes that "(t]he state of emergency [i.e., the suspension of law] defines a regime 
of the law within which the norm is valid but cannot be applied (since it has no force), and where acts 
that do not have the value oflaw acquire the force oflaw." 
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operate above the law to redeem the world35), then we can apprehend the 
discourse of genocide as "internal" conflict management, as resembling 
and replicating the imperial dimensions (or at least the imperialist appetite 
in such conflict management) of a discourse of "external" management of 
the omni-crisis that sustains the sovereign's existence.36 The story of the 
omni-crisis as implicated in the sustenance of sovereignty and, in tum, the 
strong and secure modem state, is both the rational deduction of the theory 
of sovereignty, whether before or after the law, but depends for its existence 
or reality on the "management" of a suppressed and displaced "irrational" 
and the creation of a libidinal investment in that displacement/management. 
Another way of characterizing the rational displacement of (self-) 
aggressivity is to consider that the perverse and secret rush we get from 
knowing that we are safe from "that horror, out there" is something like the 
rush of recognition that our safety is in some, perhaps highly (or not so 
highly) attenuated sense, a consequence of "that horror, out there."37 The 
resort to moral action, unexceptionable as it may be31 is also at base an exercise of power with all the ambivalence that entails. 8 
I posit, therefore, a parallel between the modem sovereign and the self, 
and suggest that a critique of the borders of innocence created by 
externalization is also a critique of the legal system that maintains them. 
The object must be to discomfort, as it were the "comforting stories," to 
unravel the fabric (semantic debate) into which the external event is 
embroidered. The comforting story in question is the juridical discourse on 
genocide; that is, the term itself and the narrative that subtends it is, in 
Kennedy's terms, a deferral of the confrontation with the ambiguity and 
confusion or, more deeply, the fraught sense of shame, complicity, illicit 
fascination, and finally, abjection of the event and its representation, even 
as the images and stories produce, or spin, ambiguities and confusions 
within the memorials-and counter-memorials-to the "singularity" of the 
event.39 
35 See Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Court in Context: Mediating the Global and Local 
in the Age of Accountability, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 712, 715 (2003)(review essay). 
Id. 
Based on its self-conception as the sole superpower and 'leader of the free world,' the United 
States contends that it plays an exceptional role in enforcing international Jaw through the 
use of armed force, and that it must not be inhibited in discharging its unique responsibility 
for fear of politically motivated prosecutions (or because of any other external legal 
constraints, for that matter). 
36 See EMMANUEL TODD, AFTER EMPIRE: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE AMERICAN ORDER 3 (2003). 
Id. 
The elevation of terrorism into a universal force institutionalizes a permanent state of war 
across the globe-a fourth 'World War' according to certain American authors who see 
nothing ridiculous about considering the Cold War as the third. Everything seems to indicate 
that the United States is, for some obscure reason, trying to maintain a certain level of 
international tension, a situation of limited but permanent war. 
37 See JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 90 (Doubleday 1997) (1899), for a famous literary 
rendition of that moment of recognition spoken by Kurtz: "The horror! The horror!" 
38 See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 15. "Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself but on 
the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace." Id. 
39 See generally KENNEDY, supra note 15. 
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Genocide, as a discourse, is redemptive. This is the essence of 
Samantha Power's powerful critique of U.S. foreign policy in the wake of 
genocide: the absence of a forceful response is a moral failure.40 But the 
capacity to use force, its index within the equation of ethical action, is but 
one, albeit crucial, element of the sovereign's legitimacy: the sovereign is 
implicated within the genocide. The sovereign is called into being by 
crises,41 none more so than the instantiation of genocide. It is this 
knowledge, this "ambiguity42 and confusion," that sits at the heart of ethical 
action, and that analogizes the logic of imperialism, the demands of 
narration, and the self's conceptualization of an event described as 
genocide. 
This Article, then, examines the latent eroticism beneath the 
redemptive juridical discourse through a comparative analysis of the self, 
on the one hand, and the sovereign on the other, in their relationship to the 
external event or crisis. I wish to examine the extent to which there is a 
pleasurable or erotic43 element, or rush, on the psychic level for the 
individual self, or an investment-for the state in the source of its validity 
(meaning of sovereignty)-that inheres in the suffering of the other. My 
goal is to provoke the reader to question an international legal system that 
recharges and perpetuates the subconscious desire for mass violence as a 
means of verifying the moral purity of those who are not personally subject 
40 See generally SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 
poo2). 
1 See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 16. Both the supranational analogy (the international legal 
system) and the domestic legal order operate on the same terrain: the terrain of crisis. See id. "As Carl 
Schmitt has taught us, however, crisis on the terrain of the application of law should focus our attention 
on the 'exception' operative in the moment of its production." Id. Domestic and supranational law are 
both defined by their exceptionality. Exceptionality in turn is defined as follows: it means that the 
intervening authority is granted: 
(1) the capacity to define, every time in an exceptional way, the demands of intervention; 
and (2) the capacity to set in motion the forces and instruments that in various ways can be 
applied to the diversity and the plurality of the arrangements in crisis. Here, therefore, is 
born, in the name of the exceptionality of the intervention, a form of right that is really a 
right of the police . ... The judicial power to rule over the exception and the capacity to 
deploy police force are thus two initial coordinates that define the imperial model of 
authority. 
Id. at 16--17. As can be seen, whether one speaks of the modem nation state, the superpower 
ifegemon), or of"Empire" as a supranational state, the same juridical operation or gesture entails. 
I do not wish to push the analogy too far, since, in any event, Kennedy's conceptualization of 
ambiguity is more complex than simply that which is deferred or suppressed by the narration of 
experience, to wit: 
[A]ctivism avoids ambiguity by reference to an analysis that treats the ambiguity as having 
already been resolved in action. Yet, just as the patterns we embroider onto our relations are 
undone when the ambiguity of the experience is recaptured, so the ambiguity of our analyses 
is belied by the felt authenticity of our experiences. Oddly, this work-weaving meaning 
into our lives only to rip out the cloth-is forgotten, and the story seems simply to unfold, to 
progress. Propelled forward by our practice and reimagined by our analysis, time seems to 
move forward independent of our activities. Moreover, as we forget the ambiguity of our 
play, the results of our activities come to seem real. 
KENNEDY, supra note 15, at 51. What I hope to suggest by the analogy between narration and 
imperialism is simply a logic of crisis that situates the discourses on genocide, or the discourse of 
genocide, within the unconscious, the dream-world, or more precisely the "internal trajectory" of global 
power dynamics, whether these dynamics are called old state-centric imperialism, new Empire, 
supranationalism, or globalism. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 15. 
43 See GEORGES BATAILLE, EROTICISM: DEATH AND SENSUALITY 16 (Mary Dalwood trans., John Calder 
1962) (1957). "In essence, the domain of eroticism is the domain of violence, of violation." Id. 
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to the threat of genocide or the moral exceptionalism (sovereign as "he who 
decides on the exception"44) of the third party state. 45 
When we perceive the violence "out there," remote from ourselves, it 
may, on a material level, have little to do with us. But its existence has 
psychic weight that bears upon the meaning of our lived experience here in 
the safety of our home. The meaning can be expressed as a kind of 
investment in the existence of that violence, out there; this is the content of 
the "eroticism" that explains the relation of the self to the other, who is 
composed of violence and suffering across the border or zone of innocence, 
the meaning and substance of the juridical self. 
I attempt in this Article to reclaim the erotic from its specular fixation 
on the other's death. As a critique of our libidinal investments (eroticism), 
the project hopes, by extension, to critique the legal system that ratifies 
them by examining the construction of the self and the sovereign at the 
limits of law and politics. The paradigmatic case for this, I suggest, is the 
case of genocide; the point at which the self, at a distance, observes the 
enactment of the final resolution of the self-other antagonism. 
The Article is divided into three parts. In the first, I outline and explain 
what I mean by eroticism, or the "libidinal investment." In the second, I 
explain the meaning of the erotic as a disciplinary device in relation to the 
other's death. I examine the erotic as the juridical border that maintains 
and polices the rational or stabilized self (and sovereign), and propose two 
means of escape from the inevitability of the eroticism-death complex, 
indexed as the political and the moral/ethical. 
In the result, I hope to posit a "neutral space" within which the self (or 
sovereign) may discover itself, its antagonism.46 That is, within the neutral 
space, the self encounters the other not as the displacement of its own 
violence, but as the site of its alterity (its sense of otherness). As such, law 
would function as the limit of politics (war by other means) and of the 
sovereign self (or state) when its normative base (its ontology) is no longer 
the exception or the crisis. I concede that for both sovereign and self this 
may be a difficult prospect, since it requires a different perception, or 
reconfiguration, of the border-as-law that maintains the sense (or myth) of 
security. But unless we reclaim the erotic as the domain of human 
connection and community-the will to love-we cannot, in a globalized 
world, long remain unscathed by the suffering "out there," nor without 
increasingly high cost, maintain the myth of moral purity. 
44 SCHMITf, supra note 34, at 5. 
45 I am grateful to my colleague Peter Manus for his editing suggestions for this introduction. Errors 
and infelicities are my own. 
46 See ZIZEK, supra note 17, at 66. "The actual universality is not the never-won neutral space of 
translation from one particular culture to another, but, rather, the violent experience of how, across the 
cultural divide, we share the same antagonism." Id. 
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II. EROTICISM 
A. NOTHINGNESS AND THE FATALITY OF FUSION 
I read in a book today that chance, desire, fear, and death leave men and 
women face to face, alone. 47 
In this section, I hope to clarify the internal psychic drives, the erotic 
dimension of the ethical self and its relationship to the death and suffering 
of others. I will show how the legal system, by accommodating and 
projecting these libidinal investments in the face of crisis, sustains and is 
sustained by these forces as an externalization and normalization of them. 
The "ambiguity and confusion" referred to by Kennedy that slips from 
the narration (activism, analysis, representation) of event (or lived 
experience) lies, in a sense, at the heart of ethical action48 or "ethical 
consistency."49 In simple terms, the ethical is the struggle, as Slavoj Zizek 
has noted, not between existence and nonexistence, but rather between 
existence and "insistence," essentially a "striving toward existence."50 The 
ethical insistence is an encounter with nothingness, the gap between action 
and inaction, the aftermath of the pause, wherein memory is a "permanent 
doubting. "51 
But the analysis of the relationship between memory and nothingness 
is rich and ancient. Artists routinely speak of "negative space," the absence 
that allows a figure to stand out in stark relief.52 So it is with the borderline 
between self and other. As Badiou points out in his analysis of evil, "the 
most intense subjective sufferings-those that really highlight what is 
involved in 'hurting someone,' and often lead to suicide or murder-have 
as their horizon the existence of a process of love."53 As Bataille has noted 
in his study of death and sensuality, at the heart of that fraught relationship 
47 LA CAPTNE (Image Entertainment 2000). Ariane, the female character, speaks these words to Simon 
in the car after he has dragged her out of a post-concert gathering with her friends at the opera house. 
48 Kennedy's advocacy, his hope, "is that we will come to embrace the human side of humanitarian 
practice, including its dark sides, uncertainties, and ambivalences. Responsible humanitarian action in a 
cloud of uncertainty-my hope is that humanitarian advocates and policy makers will develop an 
appetite for this most basic experience of rulership." Kennedy, supra note 15, at xxv-xxvi. My 
concern, in this article, is with the extent to which the "dark side" of our virtuous instincts in fact 
creates, or contributes to the creation and perpetration of, the conditions of rule. 
49 See BADIOU, supra note 21, at 60. 
50 ZIZEK, supra note 17, at 22. 
Id. 
[T]hat which does not exist, continues to insist, striving towards existence .... When I miss 
a crucial ethical opportunity, and fail to make a move that would 'change everything,' the 
very nonexistence of what I should have done will haunt me for ever: although what I did 
not do does not exist, its spectre continues to insist. 
51 See JULIA KRISTEVA, REVOLT, SHE SAID 101 (Brian O'Keefe trans., 2002). "What Plato and St. 
Augustine referred to as memory was a permanent doubting. Its essential aspect is nothingness, from 
Heidegger to Sartre. The question of nothingness is essential as an aspect of freedom. But what is the 
meaning of nothingness: the possibility to rebel, to change and to transform." Id. 
52 
"She keeps thinking, for some reason, about the professor in her art-history class. Going on and on 
about negative space, how sculpture is about the skin, that edge where substance and absence meet. 
How the presence of empty space, a void, causes a solid object to reveal itself." Judy Budnitz, Miracle, 
THE NEW YORKER, July 12 & 19, 2004, at 87. 
53 BADIOU, supra note 21, at 66. 
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is the fatality of fusion, the quest for continuity between discontinuous 
beings.54 
Perhaps counterintuitively, the paradoxical desire for fusion is a dream 
of the sovereign, described by Hardt and Negri as the "immediacy" 
between ruler and ruled.55 Postmodemism conceives of immediacy as a 
break from the law; Michel Foucault, for instance, admonishes us to 
"[ w ]ithdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (law, limit, 
castration, lack, lacuna), which Western thought has so long held sacred as 
a form of power and an access to reality."56 He further suggests that we 
"[p ]refer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows 
over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is 
productive is not sedentary but nomadic."57 Hardt and Negri's view of late 
twentieth century globalism suggests the achievement of this vision.58 
I want to suggest a relationship between the Negative and immediacy: 
the Negative as the law or limit means that the event out there is seen, in 
stark relief, against the horizon of the desiring subject's self-projection. 
That is, if there is no mediation between my desire and the source of its 
production (immanent and supranational power, whereby immediacy 
expresses the fusion of desire and effect59), if barriers recede to the point of 
nonexistence and resurface as an insistence of the absent, then I become the 
law, I am the sovereign. The material world, the suffering of th~ wretched, 
is "im-mediated," meaning that it is "more real" (following Zizek) than 
simply my projection. In this sense, immediacy and the "exception" (law) 
become normative. 
The self depends upon the insistence of that immediated reality, 
violently recreated over and over again and willed as the reality, the center 
of my own de-realized self. This is the dream of fusion, an encounter with 
the self as the Negative. Expressed in psychoanalytic terms, the juridical, 
within that dream, is cathected, i.e., over-invested. And it is this investment 
in the center as the negative space, nothingness, which projects the will to 
fusion and the mastery over discontinuity (discontinuous being). 
54 See BATAILLE, supra note 43, at 15. "I intend to speak of these three types of eroticism in tum, to wit, 
physical, emotional and religious. My aim is to show that with all of them the concern is to substitute 
for the individual isolated discontinuity a feeling of profound continuity." Id. 
55 See generally HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30. 
56 Michel Foucault, Preface to GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND 
SCHIZOPHRENIA xiii (Robert Hurley et al. eds., Viking Press 1977) (1972). 
51 Id. 
58 But see Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97 (2002) (suggesting that the 
global gay rights movement, based on an American model, is exporting a "fixed" form of (gay or 
lesbian) identity to the rest of the world. As this form spreads, it excludes and suppresses a social 
constructionist's more fluid and hybrid model of identity-based on a more contingent, rather than 
stable, relationship between conduct and orientation/identity-which is prevalent in many parts of the 
world). 
59 See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 19. 
Id. 
We could say, in Kantian fashion, that our internal moral disposition, when it is confronted 
with and tested in the social order, tends to be determined by the ethical, political, and 
juridical categories of Empire. Or we could say that the external morality of every human 
being and citizen is by now commensurable only in the framework of Empire. This new 
framework forces us to confront a series of explosive aporias .... 
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But nothingness, fusion, immediacy, and discontinuity are, in one 
sense, tropes, i.e., ways of speaking about a central dilemma of the ethical 
subject when faced with mass suffering and death out there in the "there, 
not here." The dilemma involves a conscious will to act coupled with a 
secret, dark desire to engender the conditions that in turn dictate the ethical 
will to act. The projection of desire and violence can be revealed, 
explained, and rationalized, in part by its refracted relationship to 
imperialism or the imperialist impulse. To the extent that space and time 
have been colonized by the sovereign,60 our subconscious desires are cast 
such as to render my loneliness before death, and my violent, cathected 
response in relation to it, inevitable and ineluctable. But through the very 
tension created between nothingness and fusion, the sovereign does posit, 
in Mouffe's terms, an escape from "antagonism" to "agonism."61 The self's 
bordered relationship to the other is not inevitably innocent, and the self's 
desire for fusion may itself permit an alternative to the sense of failure that 
requires displacement, the production of a desire/abjection so normative 
and rationalized as to seem inherent in the ethical act itself. 
B. LAW AND EROTICISM: A DISCIPLINARY DEVICE 
Before discussing the alternatives to the failure of fusion, I wish to look 
more closely at the nature of the eroticism that operates to center and 
displace violence. I will then elaborate on the link between displacement 
(de-centering) and the imperialism that characterizes one sense in which 
the modern sovereign can be understood, at least as currently supported or 
permitted by the international legal system. As noted, understanding the 
border between self and violence is crucial to this analysis. 
The juridical is the repository for my desire and investment in the 
other's destruction, i.e., my investment in genocide. The juridical is a 
mechanism that constrains and cabins, but also normalizes those desires. 
The juridical locates the negative space at the center of the subject, what is 
sometimes referred to as postmodernism's "de-centered subject."62 The 
center, in turn, is the terrain of redemption. 63 The link, then, between 
destruction and redemption is sacramental, the very function of the erotic. 64 
In short, it is in part an eroticization of death that normalizes my 
investment in the destruction of the other. I propose, therefore, to examine 
this eroticization more closely as an imperialist trope. 
60 See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 10-11. This "ethico-political dynamic that lies at the heart of 
its juridical concept" involves "a boundless, universal space," and "all time." Id. at 11. "Empire 
exhausts historical time, suspends history, and summons the past and future within its own ethical order. 
In other words, Empire presents its order as permanent, eternal, and necessary." Id. 
61 CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT 4 (1999). 
62 See, e.g., Dragan Milovanovic, The Postmodernist Turn: Lacan, Psychoanalytic Semiotics, and the 
Construction of Subjectivity in Law, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 67, 70 (1994). A tenet of postmodemism 
was "the idea that the subject was not as centered and in control as prevalent ideology claimed (in fact, 
the person became seen as the de-centered subject)." Id. 
63 For Volf and Christian theology, decentering is not therefore descriptive but, rather, the prescription: 
"Whichever way the 'centering' takes place and whatever its result, the self should be de-centered, 
claims Paul. The word he uses to describe the act is 'crucified."' VOLF, supra note 20, at 70. 
64 See BATAILLE, supra note 43, 15-16. "[A]ll eroticism has a sacramental character," since the aim is 
"to substitute for the individual isolated discontinuity a feeling of profound continuity." Id. 
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To apprehend the self's investment in the law (genocide discourse) as 
the repository of the displacement of the real, one may look briefly at some 
devices that convey the law's operation. To examine the borders between 
the self and the other that seem to make genocide "out there" inevitable, 
one must delve beneath the surface, beneath the horror and fascination, to 
the psychic, erotic investments produced by the borders within the context 
of a will to fusion. First, the law operates by exclusions. I will discuss the 
link between the constitution of the (morally pure) self via exclusions and 
the disciplinary devices that exemplify this operation.65 Second, these 
devices are imperialistic,66 which recalls the relationship between narrative 
demands and imperialism's imperatives. By implication, these demands 
and imperatives are inscribed within the law or the juridical response to 
violence, whereupon we may say that the "truth" of genocidal violence-
my relation as outside the event, my silent observation (my gaze, or "magic 
eye"67) setting apart, in stark relief, the savagery of the other, the necessity 
and inevitability of my violent intervention-resides within the juridical 
mode of apprehending the event (as the real). Third, between the logic of 
nothingness and the fatality of (the will to) fusion, postmodern immediacy 
65 See VOLF, supra note 20, at 69-70. 
Psychologists tell us that humans produce and reconfigure themselves by a process of 
identifying with others and rejecting them, by repressing drives and desires, by interjecting 
and projecting images of the self and the other, by externalizing fears, by fabricating 
enemies and suffering animosities, by forming allegiances and breaking them up, by loving 
and hating, by seeking to dominate and letting themselves be dominated-and all this not 
neatly divided but all mixed up, with 'innocences' [sic] often riding on hidden 'vices,' and 
'vices' seeking compensatory redemption in contrived 'virtues.' 
Id. Note that this "mixed up" character of human psychic construction may be compared, but finally 
opposed to, the intentional decision of the sovereign to declare the enemy and deploy the state of 
emergency. See Agamben, supra note 34, at 6. On the similarities between "being," for metaphysics, 
and "violence" for the sovereign: 
Id. 
To pure being as the ultimate stake of metaphysics, corresponds pure violence as the 
ultimate stake of the political; to the onto-theological strategy that wants pure being within 
the net of logos, corresponds the strategy of exception that has to secure the relation between 
violence and law. It is as if law and logos would need an anomic or 'a-logic' zone of 
suspension in order to found their relation to life. 
66 Hardt and Negri suggest a distinction between "disciplinary society," which deploys institutional 
(mediatory) devices that discipline the subject, and the "society of control," whereby disciplinarity is 
engendered internally, no longer requiring external or institutional devices or dispositifs. Both societies 
are imperialistic, however, the radical difference being the question of the source of discipline or self-
discipline. See HARDT AND NEGRI, supra note 30, at 23. 
67 On a psychoanalytic subject struggling with a sense of insecurity and shame, Wurmser notes a 
transformation that he characterizes as "the magic eye." See LEON WURMSER, THE MASK OF SHAME 
120 ( 1994 ). "[A] quite different inner power gradually took center stage ... a more archaic version: the 
magical control by his eyes. His seeing formed, transformed, and destroyed the world." Id. Also, 
"[s]eeing was ruthlessly uncovering, intruding, and demolishing." Id. at 122. But see SIGMUND FREUD, 
TOTEM AND TABOO: ASSEMBLANCES BETWEEN THE PSYCHIC LIVES OF SAVAGES AND NEUROTICS 
(A.A. Brill trans., Random House 1946) (1918) (discussing the neurotic's belief that his thoughts create 
reality). 
The primary obsessive acts of these neurotics are of an entirely magical character. If they 
are not charms, they are at all events counter-charms, designed to ward off the expectations 
of disaster with which the neurosis usually starts. Whenever I have succeeded in penetrating 
the mystery, I have found that the expected disaster was death. Schopenhauer has said that 
the problem of death stands at the outset of every philosophy; and we have already seen ... 
that the origin of the belief in souls and in demons, which is the essence of animism, goes 
back to the impression which is made upon men by death. 
Id. at 86-87. 
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has proposed a model of salvation that justifies the exclusion, in the first 
instance, involved in the production of identity. 
But this, I submit, leaves us with a choice, for the will to fusion is also 
the will to love. How, then, do we characterize the erotic limits of the 
ethical self? What is the self's desire, and must it always lead to death and 
the abjection of alterity? We cannot know ·companionship unless we 
understand the radical loneliness at the heart of the discourse as a device 
for producing the self's desire.68 Although, as Paul Kahn suggests, love sits 
outside the law, and it is only through the law that we obtain the idea of 
love,69 the law itself provides aporia that intimate the reality and 
independence of love's existence, as the self's desire. But determining 
whether love is always colonized by the abject will to fusion and 
immediacy, or something that refuses abjection and incorporates barriers 
involves, I suggest, a choice. 
Stated at its simplest, it is a choice between love and death. 70 But 
nothing is ever quite so simple, for both contain pieces of the other. It is 
what we do with those pieces of the other within the self (law) that 
determines either a narrative that ends in the violent expulsion and 
eradication of the other, or a narrative that resists this end, thereby 
overturning the expectations oflaw as stasis.71 
These themes-eroticism and the will to fusion Ontimacy), identity and 
exclusion, desire and imperialism-may be captured in the "dispositif 
erotique" (erotic device) vividly portrayed in a 2000 film by Chantel 
Akerman called La Captive (The Captive).72 Films on taboo eroticism lend 
themselves to an excavation of the deeper erotic or libidinal investment in 
displaced violence, because for a disturbing moment they permit a view of 
eroticism in crisis, and the eroticism's deep core of violence and violation. 
Through the figure of Simon, the protagonist, I hope to clarify the 
complicity of the outside observer in the other's eroticized destruction. 
68 See, e.g., ROBERT W. FIRESTONE & JOYCE CATLETT, FEAR OF INTIMACY 24 (Am. Psychological Ass'n 
1999). "Couples and families are mere abstractions, not real entities. The individuals concerned are 
very real and do matter. Similarly, one can only analyze the value of a social system or society by 
analyzing its effect on its members: If the individual members are flourishing, it is constructive; if they 
are impaired or suffering under the social process, then it is obviously destructive." Id. 
69 See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 123 
(1999). "Law emerges as a cultural formation bounded by an other created simultaneously with law 
itself. A world of law is one in which revolution and love are constantly seen as both the objects of 
exclusion and the objects of desire." Id. 
70 See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, CNILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 55-58 (James Strachey trans., W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1961) (discussing the struggle between love and death). But see FIRESTONE & CATLETT, 
supra note 68, at 33. "I reject [Freud's] conceptualization of a death instinct as such, and instead 
~erceive aggression as derived from frustration." Id. 
1 Schmitt analyzes the distinction between war (the Greek "polemos") and "insurrection, upheaval, 
rebellion, civil war" (stasis); but Schwab notes, in the same footnote, that "[s]tasis also means the exact 
opposite, i.e., peace and order." See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 28-29 n.9 
(George Schwab trans., Rutgers Univ. Press 1976) (analyzing the distinction between war (the Greek 
"polemos")). . 
7 Akerman says her film was inspired by Marcel Proust's La Prisonniere, the fifth volume of A la 
Recherche du Temps Perdu ("Remembrance of Things Past"). The film is not a rendition of the novel, 
but it does carry the eroticism to a logical conclusion, death, rather than simply abandonment. See LA 
CAPTIVE, supra note 47. 
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As a disciplinary mechanism, the taboo eroticism in the film indexes, at 
one level, the way the violence of imperialism is internalized and encoded 
with libidinal desire, which in turn presents analogies to the discourse on 
genocide. The element of taboo eroticism played out in the genocidal event 
is particularly evident in the instance of mass rape as an act of genocide. 
These unspeakable acts are of necessity specular events, and their very 
existence weighs upon the psychic imagination as the displacement of 
violence that structures the dispositif. 
The link between rape and eroticism has been suggested by Katherine 
Baker, who outlines the many and complex motivations for rape.73 Baker's 
typologies of rape include rape as lovemaking,74 rape as theft (the 
commodification of sex),,;5 rape as a confused and thwarted "desire for 
intimacy,"76 power-rape, anger-rape,78 and sadistic rape.79 She writes: 
"Some anger rapists reach the point of what Groth calls sadism. In these 
situations, '[t]here is a sexual transformation of anger and power so that 
aggression itself becomes eroticized.' Often these rapists murder their 
victims after, and possibly even before, raping them."80 
Sadistic rapists, Baker notes, are the exception-a mere 6% of reported 
rapes-and yet, "[t]hese men are the paradigm, but they are not most 
rapists."81 Baker suggests that sadistic rape, the eroticization of violence 
and aggression, is the cultural paradigm of rape, and that this belies the 
serious harm caused by the many other kinds of rape, rape from a variety of 
other motivations, that do not conform to the sadistic rape paradigm. 82 
Another typology of rape, rape used to "insult or denigrate other 
men,"83 is particularly prevalent in war. The link to eroticism here is latent, 
related to the eroticizing of power, competition, and humiliation of the 
73 Katherine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 563 ( 1997). "Rape, at least in the words of one survivor, 'is death.' It is 'a primal experience to 
which other events might be meaningfully analogized-the 'rape' of the land, the 'rape' of a people. 
But rape itself cannot be reduced to other painful experiences." Id. at 605. 
74 See id. at 599-600. 
75 See id. at 602-03. 
76 See id. at 609. 
77 See id. at 608-09. 
78 See id. 
19 See id. at 611. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 611-12. 
Id. 
"Most rape victims are not victims of angry, sadistic rapists. This does not mean that most 
rape victims are not raped; it does not mean that rape victims fabricate their stories; and it 
does not mean that what happens to them is okay. It does belie the common belief that 
rapists are crazy men whose sadistic hunger for sex or hatred of women compels them to 
rape." 
83 Id. at 607-08. 
Id. 
Thus, the US soldiers left the 11th Brigade patch in order to impugn the honor of North 
Vietnamese men [in the My Lai rapes] .... By making the fact of their rapes public, the 
soldiers added further insult to the enemy. This view explains why rapes during wartime 
often take place in public or are [sic] committed in front of civilian witnesses, and it explains 
why rape and war have gone hand in hand since there has been war. The rapist seeks to 
demonstrate the superiority of his team. He does this by raping the property of the enemy. 
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enemy. The enemy, "the other," can be either male or female; it is rare that 
the instigator of this eroticized violation of the other is a woman. 
There have, however, been cases of women accused of encouraging 
and even committing wartime rapes. Consider the harrowing story of 
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, as told by Peter Landesman.84 This is a story of 
rape deployed as a weapon of war and of genocide-rape "unto death. "85 
Pauline, as she is generally called, is currently being detained in Arusha, 
Tanzania, where she "faces 11 charges, including genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes."86 Landesman notes that "[s]he is the first 
woman ever to be charged with these crimes in an international court. And 
she is the first woman ever to be charged with rape as a crime against 
humanity."87 Pauline is accused of goading the militias to rape the women 
before killing them.88 The soldiers, according to a witness, "said that 
Pauline had given them permission to go after the Tutsi girls, who were too 
proud of themselves .... She was the minister [for women's affairs in the 
Habyarimana administration], so they said they were free to do it."89 
"Pauline had led the soldiers to see the rape as a reward."90 Often, the 
descriptions of her crimes are brutal; for instance, this from Rose, a 
witness, to Landesman, "Hutu soldiers took m.x mother outside ... stripped 
off her clothes and raped her with a machete." 1 
Why rape? As Sydia Nduna, an advisor at the International Rescue 
Committee Rwanda tells Landesman: 
'Did you ever see the look in a woman's eyes when she sees a child of 
rape? ... It's a depth of sadness you cannot imagine.' The impact of the 
mass rapes in Rwanda, she said, will be felt for generations. 'Mass rape 
forces the victims to live with the consequences, the damage, the 
children,' Nduna explained.92 
Landesman continues, "Making matters worse, the rapes, most of them 
committed by many men in succession, were frequently accompanied by 
other forms of physical torture and often staged as public performances to 
multiply the terror and degradation. So many women feared them that they 
84 Peter Landesman, A Womans Work, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., Sept. 15, 2002 at 82. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 86. 
In most cases, she is accused of inciting crimes rather than carrying them out herself. 
However, according to a document prepared by tribunal investigators in preparation for the 
trial, one witness, code-named Q.C., saw a Tutsi community leader die 'at the hands of 
Nyiramasuhuko.' (The report does not specify what weapon Pauline used) .... Pauline has 
consistently denied the charges against her. 
Id. at 86. Another woman, Biljana Plavsic, former President of the Republika Srpska, was also charged 
with genocide and crimes against humanity, for her part in the Bosnian atrocities. In October 2002 she 
pied guilty to one count of persecution, and was sentenced to 11 years. See, e.g., International Criminal 
Court Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Case, Case Information Sheets, at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
~lance/plavsic.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2004). 
Id. at 83. 
89 Id. at 84. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 89. 
92 Id. 
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often begged to be killed instead."93 The theme of rape being worse than 
death is picked up later on, when Landesman speaks to the prisoners in the 
Rwandan detention centers, accused of rape and murder.94 This is one of 
those interviews: 
Lucien told me in detail about killing [a woman about whom he now had 
recurring nightmares]. But when I asked Lucien if he'd raped the woman, 
he fell silent and fought back tears. Every prisoner I spoke with described 
explicitly whom he killed and how. Not a single one admitted to raping a 
Tutsi woman.95 
Landesman speculates that this silence may be for two reasons: one, the 
government had listed "rape committed during the genocide" as "the 
highest category of crime; those convicted were sentenced to death."96 The 
second reason, he speculates, may have been because "These men could 
somehow justify to themselves having murdered but not raped. In any 
event, the weight of that level of confession was obviously too much to 
bear, and if there could be any tan9ible proof that rape was considered the 
more shameful crime, it was this."9 
Rape is viewed as the most shameful part of the genocidal experience, 
according to Robert Jay Lifton, because it destro~s the woman, "the symbol 
of purity" which is at the center of the family.9 Lifton reiterates that "in 
this way, rape is worse than death. "99 The more powerful the claim of the 
thing to be destroyed, the more virulent the destruction, and the more 
shameful the feeling in its wake. Luchino Visconti's films, especially The 
Damned,100 capture this sense of the erotic deployed to destroy the other 
(or, more precisely, the self's alterity). Martin von Essenbeck, the 
ambitious son in The Damned0 capitulates to his bitterness and destroys his 
mother Sophie by raping her. 1 1 By doing so, he finally achieves the sense 
of invincibility, which in the film is symbolized by donning the uniform of 
93 Id. 
Id. 
Often the rapes were in fact a prelude to murder. But sometimes the victim was not killed 
but instead repeatedly violat~d and then left alive; the humiliation would then affect not only 
the victim but also those closest to her. Other times, women were used as a different kind of 
tool: half-dead, or even already a corpse, a woman would be publicly raped as a way for 
Interahamwe mobs to bond together. 





99 Id. On the subject of shame, quoting Robert Jay Lifton: 
Id. 
'Rape sets in motion continuous suffering and extreme humiliation that affects not just the 
individual victim but everyone around her,' said ... Lifton, who[ se books have] explored the 
psychology of genocide. 'A woman is seen as a symbol of purity. The family revolves 
around that symbol. Then here is the brutal attack on that, stigmatizing them all. All this 
perpetuates the humiliation, reverberating among survivors and their whole families .... In 
this way, rape is worse than death.' 
100 THE DAMNED (Warner Brothers 1969). 
101 Id. 
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a Nazi officer. But it is a symbol also of his peculiar catastrophe. 102 The 
sex act in the film is depicted with immense tenderness, like the still waters 
of an unfathomably deep hatred. Meanwhile, his mother slips into 
madness, catalepsy, and eventual (enforced) suicide. 
When the Hutu militias raped the Tutsi women "out of existence," 
fueled as they were by envy and enmity toward the Tutsis, 103 they were 
"engaged not only in an act of sexual transgression but also a purifying 
ritual. ... 'The propaganda made Tutsi women powerful, desirable-and 
therefore something to be destroyed,' Rhonda Copelan [said]."104 But what 
drove Pauline to incite rape? Landesman discovers that Pauline and her 
family are in fact Tutsis, at least in part. 105 Her sister, Vineranda, 
speculated that when things changed in Rwanda in 1959 and it became 
dangerous to be a Tutsi, "Pauline was afraid that maybe the government 
would find out. And she was among many men in the government. And 
she had money and a position. She didn't want to lose that."106 Lifton 
suggests another reason, "'Part of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko's fierceness had 
to do with eliminating the Tutsi in her,' he hypothesized. 'She was 
undergoin¥ an individual struggle to destroy that defiled element in 
herself."10 
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Sophie von Essenbeck (of The Damned), 
despite their different fates, were similar with respect to their sons. As 
Landesman notes, "Pauline did possess humanity, but it was in short 
supply, and she reserved it for her only son, Shalom, whom she had helped 
tum into a rapist and a killer."108 The son in each case had been created to 
destroy the object of self-hatred within and to purify the subject. 109 
The themes of purity and shame are particularly key to the 
nonconsensual act of sadistic or denigrative rape. But they are also key to 
the consensual sadomasochistic sexual relationship in Akerman's depiction 
of taboo eroticism, where sex is encoded with the death instinct or will. 
Sadistic rape, "rape unto death," and consensual eroticized aggression, 
however, all take place within a cultural context. Baker notes that 
what leads many rapists to rape is not a perverse or abnormal sexual need, 
but a common, if distressing, failure to understand or appreciate the 
gravity of the harm that they inflict when they obtain sex by force. This 
102 Shame and catastrophe are closely linked. Here, the film seems to suggest that the son suffers a 
catastrophe, of which his mother's rape is at least in part the denouement, when he discovers that the six 
rcear-old girl whom he ravaged and drove to suicide was in fact a Jew. See id. 
03 Landesman, supra note 84, at 130. "Unlike the Nazis, who were fueled by myths of Aryan 
superiority, the Hutus were driven by an accumulated rage over their lower status and by resentment of 
suoposed Tutsi beauty and arrogance." Id. 
104"/d. 
105 See id. 
106 Id. 
101 Id. at 132. 
108 Id. at 134. 
109 The mother, after the rape, runs her hands over a lock of her own blond hair preserved amongst her 
son's childhood possessions. She also finds crude childish paintings representing her son murdering his 
mother with the words, "Mother destroy." See THE DAMNED, supra note I 00. 
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failure is linked to the cultural acceptance of sexualized violence, 
instrumental aggression, and a commodified view of sexuality. 110 
This is equally true of consensual violent or sadomasochistic sex (taboo 
eroticism). 
Akerman's film, La Captive, is not explicitly sadomasochistic, but 
suggests the mapping of sex over the attempt to control the core of erotic 
violence (violence "unto death"). 111 In analyzing the film, I want to 
highlight the norms that translate this attempt to control the death wish 
through a displacement of violation onto the other, i.e., the deeper 
substratum of the juridical discourse (libidinal investment in the 
borderline). 
La Captive begins with Simon, blandly handsome and somewhat 
delicate, watching a film of a group of young women cavorting on a beach 
in Normandy. 112 The film is silent. Eventually it settles upon the face of 
Ariane, whom we later discover is Simon's lover. Ariane and her friend 
Arldree are seen sitting next to each other and Ariane 's mouth moves as she 
stares blankly at the camera. Simon plays the scene over and over, 
evidently attempting to decipher the words. "I ... think ... I think ... I .. 
. really ... I really ... like ... I really like you."113 He seems either to be 
projecting her words or his own, but in any event he speaks for a silent (and 
silenced) Ariane. 
Simon lives in a strangely Kafka-esque apartment, lots of small rooms 
and tight, winding corridors, in a posh part of Paris. He drives expensive 
cars and is often chauffeur-driven in a Rolls-Royce. He lives with his 
grandmother, Ariane, and a housemaid. Ariane has her own room, 
apparently because she "brings in" pollen, to which Simon is allergic. But 
the provision of separate chambers for the two lovers is only one way in 
which the film emphasizes symmetries that call attention to their 
relationship as a particular kind of "dispositif erotique" (erotic device), as 
Akerman calls it. 114 The inner, claustrophobic spaces are juxtaposed 
against the open spaces in a seemingly empty Paris, as well as the open 
country scenes. Within those void-like spaces, the minimalist, anti-
naturalistic acting style stands out in sharp relief, the inscrutability taking 
on the substance of a solid object. 115 The void-like spaces also emphasize 
the inner chambers, in which the mother-son relationship is played out by 
allusion to the Simon-Ariane affair. 116 
In both inner and outer spaces, we follow Simon as he becomes 
increasingly obsessed with managing every aspect of Ariane's life, 
110 Baker, supra note 73, at 612. 
111 See LA CAPTIVE, supra note 4 7. 
112 See id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (Akerrnan's interview about the film is recorded on the 2001 DVD release.) 
115 Cf Budnitz, supra note 52, at 87 (inscrutability analogous to the baby's blackness as 
color/complexion, rather than the absence of color). 
116 Akerman affirms the mother-son dimension in relation to the interiors in this and other of her films, 
within the interview: the apartments "are both protective and suffocating .... We don't need to search 
far [for why this is so]: it's the mother relationship." LA CAPTIVE, supra note 47. 
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including the thoughts and dreams to which he has no access. Ariane 
continually escapes, and is undisturbed by his scrutiny, his following her 
about, even his violent dragging of her from a soiree with her friends on 
one occasion. In a style reminiscent of the French nouveau-roman, their 
words are spare and repetitive. She says things like, "What I want is what 
you want"; he says, "As you know I am without memory," but later insists, 
during their breakup (dialogue taken more directly from Proust), that she 
confess more of her lies: "But what are two lies? Give me at least four. 
Then maybe I'll believe you. Without blame. At least I'll have memories, 
real ones. "117 But Ariane has no more to tell: "No, nothing. Nothing else." 
"Nothing else?" "Nothing."118 
When Simon insists she tell him more lies "for my dignity" and 
suggests that she had never loved him the way she had loved and continues 
to miss her life as a lesbian (there are suggestions she continues to enjoy 
lesbian affairs even under Simon's watch, further inflaming his obsessions), 
Ariane has one of her longest monologues in the film: 
Ariane: You talk of things you don't know. 
Simon: No, alas. We're like strangers at times. 
Ariane: At times, yes. But that's what I like. You want to know all, as if 
that changed something. Me, I ask you nothing. Neither what you think, 
nor dream. And if you told me all, I feel I'd love you less. I love you 
because there's a part of you I don't know. I imagine you've this world I 
cannot enter. That it's closed to me only pleases me. 
Simon: See? We cannot get alon~. I'm the total opposite (le contraire ). 
For me, love is the very opposite. 11 
The oft-repeated words-"au contraire," "si tu veux," "rien"-suggest 
that the erotic device works precisely because they want different things 
which are both, paradoxically, satisfied by the device: her elusiveness feeds 
his obsession, and his surveillance allows her to live in the moments of 
escape. The rigid formality of the device provides the necessary constraint 
for her erotic imagination and, ultimately, unattainability. The 
consummation of their affair, within the cramped ~parters of Simon's or 
Ariane's chambers, is also represented as onanistic, 1 0 with a fully-clothed 
Simon rubbing himself against a sleeping Ariane (she may be feigning 
sleep) until he ejaculates (Ariane, meanwhile, cries "Andree!" after one 
such incident). Likewise, the bathroom scene, where each bathes on 
opposite sides of an opaque glass partition, suggests the impenetrability of 
their erotic lives, even as their conversation consists of Ariane worrying 
about how much she smells, and Simon giving detailed instructions as to 




120 In the Akerman interview, the interviewer notes, in relation to the love scenes, "We can't say that 
Simon has failed." Id. 
121 Id. 
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The eroticism of the lovers is encoded (code, coda) with death, 
suggested by the score itself (Rachmaninoff's "Isle of the Dead"). Fusion 
takes place between self and other only as shadows, crossing and mergin~ 
across the walls of isolated buildings or on the grass of an empty park. 1 
Simon literally has an allergic reaction to Ariane, a ''jlorilege vide," the 
pollen of her efflorescence symbolizing her ripeness unto death, her careful 
(and separate) toilette and ultimate effluence (she is drowned, or drowns 
herself, it is unclear) representing the purification rites that are achieved in 
the end. Death has been signified at the beginning, through Simon's 
imposition of a script onto Ariane's silence, and is suggested by the opacity 
of the bathroom screen (death of the gaze, inscrutability). 
The encoding of death as the rigid law of the erotic is also signaled by 
the peculiar position of the spectator. We are complicit from the beginning, 
as we watch Simon stalk his desire through the empty streets of Paris, 
reminiscent of Hitchcock's Vertigo. The cultivated blandness of Simon's 
face, the subtle vulnerability of his body always clad in gray, his duck-like 
gait, make him an easy receptacle for our own projections. He is a ready 
conduit for our surveillance of Ariane, awakening a curiosity and an illicit 
desire for penetration and exposure, for "real" memories (what really 
happens between Ariane and the opera singer? Between Ariane and 
Andree, with their secret smiles and giggles?). 
Simon's fragility suggests the stereotypical mama's boy, engendering a 
desire to protect him in the wild, abstract, open spaces, where death 
threatens (Simon asks Ariane to kiss him as she drives and she obliges; the 
car lurches onto an embankment, opposite a cliff). Simon's loneliness and 
fixation on the sex lives of women suggests a libidinal cathexis that borders 
on homo- or auto-eroticism, recalling the allusive and suppressed 
homosexuality of Marcel's relationship to Albertine in Proust's 
Remembrance. A cold, wet, trembling and solitary123 Simon at the end 
recalls the self-mastery of Pauline's son Shalom (as rapist and killer), or the 
debauched son Martin in The Damned, where the protagonist kills that 
which is himself, that which he loves (erotic obsession). 124 Simon, bobbing 
closer toward us across the waves as the score swells louder, is finally the 
master of this dark universe, dominating the alienated landscape, the grey, 
chopping waves and the bleak promontory in the distance. But the cost of 
122 This seems to be a popular device in films of the erotic. In L'annee derniere a Marienbad, the 
protagonists compare themselves to shadows; for instance, the woman, A, says to the man, X, that "You 
are like a shadow closing in on me .... " (" Vous etes comme une ombre et vous attendez que me proche 
... Oh laissez-moi, laissez-moi, laissez-moi.") L'ANNEE DERNIERE A MARIENBAD (Alain Resnais 
1961). 
123 Simon is in a boat with a boatman; a blanket on the floor of the boat may be covering Ariane's body. 
See id. 
124 For a related examination of the eroticization of violence whereby the protagonist gains mastery over 
the other by subverting the male-female power relations, see e.g., Liliana Cavanni's The Night Porter. 
The female victim (Lucia) of sadomasochistic rape and abuse by a Nazi officer (Max) in a concentration 
camp during the war meets her abuser twelve years later in a hotel in Vienna, where she has come to 
stay with her famous pianist husband. Since the war, Max is already a reduced man, a porter at the 
hotel. The two enter and replay their sexual relationship, but this time Lucia, as the masochist, has the 
power, and she uses it to destroy Max, ultimately destroying herself in the process. THE NIGHT PORTER 
(Iotar Film 1973). 
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mastery is that Simon has had to rewrite the earlier scene at the beach. The 
frolicking women become a disjointed memory recalled through the lens of 
a destroyed but transcendent Simon, shivering in the dawn wind and 
scarred by Ariane's absence. 125 
Negative space, then, becomes the central trope in this eroticization of 
death. Here I want to pick up the themes suggested in the film and relate 
them to the analysis of the discourse on genocide. Negative space is also a 
central theme in the discourse on genocide as the constitutive element of 
the subject's relation to the other: the other is petrified within the void, 
quarantined within the opaque interior spaces, and abjected into the 
turbulent sea, far from the center, far from conscious will. Where Pauline's 
fixation on rape as the means toward this abjection is more allusive, the 
film represents the abject more explicitly, if elliptically, within the 
structuring of space, time, consciousness, and memory. 
Thinking of the relationship between the erotic and death as a carefully 
structured dispositif, one sees an order or a "law" in operation, and it is the 
law as crisis, exception (corruption) as norm. It is the antithesis of 
romance, 126 love without memory, an investment in the decomposition127 of 
love. Love is envisaged, precisely because of this investment, as perfect 
merger, as ritual purification (shadows are pure, abstract, empty), and as an 
overcoming of the self (shadows are darkness, other, the not-self, the 
aporetic insistence). Simon's being, as with the spectator's in relation to 
the object (and production) of desire, is "a rupture opening to let out the 
'excess' of an unmaintainable and thus delusive unity, whether that unity is 
consciousness, the body, a community, or even a nation."128 
Eroticized death, or the decomposition of love, is the substratum of the 
juridical translation of the event or crisis. 129 The denial (or effluence) of 
125 See, e.g., GILLES DELEUZE, CINEMA 2: THE nME-[MAGE at 196 (Hugh Tomlinson & Robert Galeta 
trans., Athlone 1989). In reference to another of Akerman 's films, Jeanne Dielmann says 
Id. 
In the same place or in space, a woman's body achieves a strange nomadism which makes it 
cross ages, situations and places (this was Virginia Woolf's secret in literature). The states of 
the body secrete the slow ceremony which joins together the corresponding attitudes, and 
develop a female gest which overcomes the history of men and the crisis of the world. It is 
this gest which reacts on the body giving it a hieratism like an austere theatricalization, or 
rather a 'stylization.' 
126 In his interview, Akerman states, "[La Captive is t]he opposite of a romantic film. Even if there's 
romantic music." LA CAPTIVE, supra note 4 7. 
127 I borrow the term from Deleuze's Cinema 2: Time-Image, in reference to 
a process of decomposition which eats away at them [i.e., Visconti 's aristocrats] from within, 
and makes them dark and opaque: the rotting of Ludwig II's teeth, family rot which takes 
over the teacher in Conversation Piece, the debasement of Ludwig Il's love-affairs; and 
incest everywhere as in the Bavarian family, the return of Sandro, the abomination of The 
Damned; everywhere the thirst for murder and suicide, or the need for forgetting and death, 
as the old prince [in The Leopard] says on behalf of the whole of Sicily. It is not just that 
these aristocrats are on the brink of being ruined; the approaching ruin is only a 
consequence. 
DELEUZE, supra note 125, at 94-95. 
128 GEORGES BATAILLE, VISIONS OF EXCESS: SELECTED WRITINGS, I 927-1939 xxi (Allan Stocki trans., 
Univ. of Minn. 1985.) 
129 This relation is Freudian and depends upon the central absence and transcendence of the phallus as 
law. A critique of this Freudian analysis notes: 
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alterity-the projection of violence-is no more than the conception of 
love and care of the other that comes to us through the distorting lens of 
exclusion. Exclusion, as I hope to show in the following, is the gesture of 
the law (exception) that constrains the category of the ethical. As such, this 
problematic of an eroticism-death complex is historically contingent: the 
more the self or sovereign is im-mediated, the more alterity is eroticized 
and abjected (law of exception). The discourse on genocidal violence 
represents a code, or a mode of surveillance or disciplinary mechanism 
(dispositif), tying us rigorously to the immanent specular, requiring the 
evisceration of a failed will to fusion with the other. 
Confinement, decomposition, sacral purification, 130 the fatality of 
fusion: these are the themes that map both the eroticism of death (alterity) 
and genocide as a juridical discourse (the ethical self). In both, the 
investment in death suggests the tension between justice-each party 
obtains what he or she wants; the device, as with the juridical, is a 
success131-and truth: disclosure, memory, counter-memory (amnesia132). 
As Bataille notes, "Eroticism opens the way to death. Death opens the way 
to the denial of our individual lives. Without doing violence to our inner 
selves, are we able to bear a negation that carries us to the farthest bounds 
of possibility?"133 The erotic, in short, is always a tension between love 
and violation. 
Genocide, the annihilation of the other, occurs at a distance. But 
excavating the eroticism suppressed within the discourse on genocide may 
reveal genocide as also the narrative of displaced violence. The narrative 
is ruled and managed by the ethical act; this is apposite to the event itself as 
engendered in part and permitted by the erotic investment itself. The 
subterranean darkness, the subconscious terrain that orders and cabins our 
desire for confinement within the code, the will to an impossible fusion, the 
ensuing disgust and exclusion: all this suggests something more subtle, 
more elusive, than simply the increasingly depressed and cauterized ethical 
The [sexual] triangle takes form in the parental use [mommy-daddy-me], and reproduces 
itself in the conjugal use. We do not yet know what forces bring about this triangulation that 
interferes with the recording of desire in order to transform all its productive connections. 
But we are able at least to follow, abstractly, the manner in which these forces proceed .... It 
is clear that such a totality-unity is posited only in terms of a certain mode of absence, as that 
which partial objects and subjects of desire 'lack' .... This common, transcendent, absent 
something will be called phallus or Jaw, in order to designate 'the' signifier that distributes 
the effects of meaning throughout the chain and introduces exclusions there (whence the 
oedipalizing [sic] interpretations ofLacanism). 
GILLES DELEUZE & FELD( GUATIARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM & SCHIZOPHRENIA 72-73 (Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem & Helen R. Lane trans., Viking Press 1977). 
130 
"[A]ll eroticism has a sacramental quality." BATAILLE, supra note 43, at 15-16. 
131 Akerman contends, in the interview, that the erotic device "suits them," recalling a similar 
mechanism in Stanley Kubrick's Eyes Wide Shut: "In that macabre, theatrical scene, these powerful 
reople" develop a device "that suits their eroticism." LA CAPTIVE, supra note 47. 
32 With regard to the films of Orson Welles, "Welles's nihilism finds a way of being expressed which is 
inherited from Nietzshe: suppress your recollections, or suppress yourselves." DELEUZE, supra note 
125,atll3. 
133 See BATAILLE, supra note 43, at 24. After quoting from Rimbaud, Bataille adds: "Poetry leads to the 
same place as all forms of eroticism-to the blending and fusion of separate objects. It leads us to 
eternity, it leads us to death, and through death to continuity. Poetry is eternity; the sum matched with 
the sea." Id. at 25. 
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sense as more and more images from "out there" drag us into the vortex of 
a "pornography"134 of specular violence and humiliation. There is, I 
suggest, something more willed, something intimating actual governance 
and conflict management, inflorescent and suppressed, that is evident in the 
pervasive production of images and stories of the ravaged and chaotic 
other. In short, there is something of the willed if subconscious production 
of otherness as chaotic and violent. 
In the following analysis of the discourse on genocide as a function of 
borders, I hope to show that the spectator, the "we," is a discursive identity, 
along with the actual victim and perpetrator of genocidal violence. I do not 
mean to suggest a moral equivalence between the three identities by 
arguing that the discursive borders are constitutive of their particular 
identities. That is, I do not suggest that there are not "real" victims, 
perpetrators and observers of genocidal violence, but rather that their 
identities within the discourse as such are a function of the discourse. Each 
party enters the discourse and incorporates the identity (assignation) by 
choice, by a prescriptive love that is a shadow of community. I believe it is 
here, at the borders constructed as a function of identity, that the imperialist 
script makes its claims upon us, upon our desires. Thus, it is not so much 
the fact of cabining desire that is problematic with respect to the interface 
of death, self, and other, so much as the way desire is calibrated and 
perceived to engender the will to purity and disaggregation. 
III. BORDERS 
A. THE WILL TO MORAL PURITY 
The terror of recognizing this intimate enemy constitutes another threat to 
our sense of security and self-assurance. 
-Robert Firestone135 
In this part on eroticism and borders, I begin with the normative border 
as the stable wall that divides the self from the other as an operation, within 
the crisis (exception) of the wall that divides the self from its alterity. I will 
analyze two alternatives to the norm of stability: one suggests the 
nonexclusionary border, a porosity that permits a view of the self's 
otherness within the moment of love and community. This view, taken 
from theology, posits a libidinal investment in the eroticism of the "death" 
of the self, thus obviating abjection (or the displacement of violence and 
chaos onto the other). The second view, taken from secular liberalism and 
it postmodern critique, posits borders as "borderlessness" or hybridity. 
134 See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, The Terrorist as Auteur, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, available at 
www.nytimes.com/2004/1 l/14/14TERROR.htrnl (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) (discussing the 
proliferation of executions and bombings by terrorists, noting that "( t ]his is terrorism as pornography, 
and it acts like pornography: at first making audiences feel curious and aroused, despite themselves, 
then ashamed, possibly degraded and finally, perhaps, just indifferent."). Ignatieff's call is to a return to 
our "repugnance" in order not to descend, in the "vortex," to become like the terrorists, i.e., "by 
becoming as barbarous as he is." See id. 
135 FIRESTONE & CATLETT, supra note 68, at 34. 
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This too translates the eroticism of death as the embrace of immanence or 
immortality. 136 Both are concerned with a "return to the self' and its return 
to the political as a reconfiguration of the border as law, and both begin 
with a perception of law, under the stable border of the modern sovereign, ' 
as the "exception" or crisis necessary for the meaning of sovereignty within 
the international legal system (how global conflicts are managed). The 
"neutral space" within which reconfiguration is permitted (between self and 
other) may have its weaknesses, but at least posits the possibility of choice 
and thus the non-inevitability of the death-erotic complex of the discourse 
on genocide. 
There is a difference between eradicating borders altogether and 
reconfiguring the borders that divide. The fantasy of fusion offers a vision 
of human community as mad. Abjection and the fear of fusion, in tum, are 
an index of the surveillance and control of the borders used to countermand 
the excess of the other, translated within the juridical as the proper 
maintenance of the self against the terror of violence. The borders define 
the violence as external and foreign to the self. 
The project, then, is to reconsider borders: of innocence, of safety, of 
fear. Gaps are opened up only insofar as it is necessary to evacuate the 
other, rather than to permit the other to reside within the self. Recall, for 
instance, Ariane's plaint to Simon, "If you told me all I feel I'd love you 
less"-compared with his to her: "For me, love is the very opposite." 137 
Surveillance-by first suppressing the erotic-death complex-is permitted 
and enforced by the central vacuity (de-centeredness) of the subject. The 
borders are necessary to maintain control. Borders have thus been 
endowed with the incidents of power: along the parapets of the wall, the 
sovereign polices its territory and protects itself from incursion. Within the 
discourses of imperialism and genocide, borders are the site of rule and 
command. 
In this section, I propose to reconsider borders with two premises in 
mind. First, borders themselves are not the problem to be eliminated since, 
given the imperialist script, their eradication merely ratifies a dream of 
fusion that is itself problematic. The dream, of course, is powerful and 
persuasive. Second, borders, as the site of rule and command, are also the 
site of desire with respect to both capital and libidinal investments. For 
Deleuze and Guattari the border, in the figure of the Oedipal, controls "the 
economy of flows. The flows and productions of desire will simply be 
viewed as the unconscious of the social productions. Behind every 
investment of time and interest and capital, an investment of desire, and 
vice versa."138 This again argues against the eradication of borders. As 
Miroslav Vcilf notes (in the religious context), "A demarcation line exists, 
136 
"We are afraid to discover not that we are mortal but, rather, that we are immortal." See Z!i.EK, 
sur,ra note 17, at 69. 
13 LA CAPTIVE, supra note 47. 
138 Mark Seem, Introduction to ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA, at xv, xviii. 
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but the focus is not on 'maintaining the boundary' but 'on reaffirming the 
center. "'139 
B. EROTIC MOMENTS 
The return to oneself leads the individual to question his truth .... 
-Julia Kristeva 140 
Kigali, Rwanda: fall, 1995. I am a member of the United Nations 
Human Rights Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR). There are fourteen of us, 
all lawyers, from different parts of the world: United States, Canada, 
United Kingdom, Spain, France, Sweden, Austria, Peru, Ecuador, Greece, 
and Ghana (that would be me). It is mid-September and we have been here 
for about a month. My duties in Kigali include centralizing the reports 
from the field teams, which involves frequent trips to the prefectures. I'm 
responsible for three such teams, all in the north. One day, I accompany 
the team responsible for Kibungo prefecture to the west of Kigali. We visit 
the Ntarama Church, the site of one of the worst massacres in 1994. It is a 
year later, but the church has been cordoned off and the bodies still lie 
rotting on the grounds and within the church itself. The local gendarmes 
let us onto the grounds; a desk has been set up near the church entrance, 
upon which have been piled bones and skulls collected from the grounds 
and the outlying area. We are accompanied by Jacques, 141 a senior U.N. 
officer assigned to Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the genocide; 
he's been with the mission, in other words, for about a year. He took a 
leave of absence from his job as lecturer at a university in Quebec. 
I have come out of the church and feel nauseous, dizzy. People are 
taking pictures of the bodies, of the small collection of curious children 
standing on a knoll. I lean against the church wall, too undone even to swat 
the flies away. In front of me is a tall, very handsome Rwandan gendarme. 
He picks up a skull from the table nearby and shakes it; a two-inch long 
nail rattles about inside the skull. The gendarme looks at me, his eyes 
seeming for an instant to blaze. But as I look, his face becomes a mask. 
He puts the skull down. Jacques is next to him, takes his arm, and leads 
him away, speaking softly. I've heard that they are lovers. Love, suddenly, 
amongst all this; I feel amazed, and envious, and then ashamed. 
It is now mid-November. The mission has been exhausting, relentless, 
intensely rigorous, depressing. Our sense of connection to the outside 
world seems tenuous: the O.J. Simpson trial, the Canadian referendum on 
self-determination, all coming to us like a pantomime through a veil, 
vaguely irrelevant and yet crucially important, the link to other lives. Our 
sense of connection to the people here seems equally tenuous: their grief is 
139 VOLF, supra note 20, at 71. The statement is made with respect to the recentering of the decentered 
self by the "crucifixion," and as such may be controversial, to say the least, within the secular context. 
It does offer an alternative to the eradication of borders which seems, at face. value, to be the solution 
proposed by postrnodemists, as I suggest in the following. See also Tawia Ansah, Surprised by Sin: 
Human Rights and Universality, 30 SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L L. & COM. 307 (2003) (discussing the 
decentered self). 
140 Kristeva, supra note 51, at I 0 I. 
141 All names changed to preserve privacy. 
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unfathomable, the intense competition between returning Tutsi refugees 
and local Tutsi survivors seems all-consuming, and yet a deflection from 
other, deeper issues; the hot tension between Hutus and Tutsis, the 
presumptively guilty and the innocent, still percolates, often erupting in 
violence. And then there is the welter of languages, of missions, 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, local and foreign, 
all with different mandates and agendas, all throwing money and ideas and 
demands and information at the hapless Rwandans. 
The sense of connection is further attenuated by the sheer scope of the 
problems: so many rape victims, so many orphaned children, so many 
scarred and embattled bodies and psyches, and so much mask-like stoicism 
and silence. We bond amongst ourselves, but this too becomes incestuous. 
Jealousies and national rivalries flare up as the Canadians vie against the 
Americans, the Europeans against both and amongst each other, the South 
Americans and Asians forming and breaking alliances, the whites and 
blacks beginning to speak of the "privileges" of the other, and so on. 
Connectedness is in short supply. 
I accompany one of my teams on a field trip in the northern prefecture 
of Ruhengheri. I'm delighted to get out of the capital and spend some time 
with my good friend Perikles. We visit a detention center deep in the 
forests, having received reports of prisoner abuse. The trip is largely pro 
forma: the team interviews various local officials as the villagers gather 
around and look on, curiously. The soldiers patrol the vicinity. The 
detention center itself, known as a "cach6t," is a small square building with 
a bare floor and a motley collection of detainees, many apprehended with 
nothing more than a pointed finger and the word, "lnterahamwe!"142 
Because they are Hutu, nothing more need be said; this is, after all, only a 
year after the genocide. But it is part of our job to see that they receive due 
process, hence the interviews and the record checks. 
I wait outside the cachot for my colleague Catha to conclude her 
interviews so we can head out to the next village before sunset. A 
gendarme leaves the office building nearby, and the soldiers around the 
cach6t seem to straighten up. The gendarme comes toward me, his 
Kalashnikov slung over a shoulder. I'm struck by his beauty, but this is not 
unusual in Rwanda. He takes my hand, says he's the new commander-in-
chief of the gendarmes, is pleased to meet me, and asks me my name. And 
then something happens, something strange. We connect. In my mind I 
see Jacques and his lover; I think of other stories of international workers 
having liaisons with the locals. He holds my hand; his name is Pascal. 
Time stops as we stand just so, staring at each other. I fancy myself in 
love. And then he talks, in French: "Here in Rwanda, we are still suffering 
not only the effects of the genocide, but the genocide goes on," he says. 
"The woods around here are full of interahamwe. I have authority to shoot 
them on sight if they are suspects and resist arrest." I remember 
142 The Kinyarwandan word means "those who struggle together" and was used by the civilian militias 
who began the slaughtering in April 1994, aided and trained by government armed forces. See, e.g., 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/interahamwe.htm. 
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remonstrating, something gentle, effete. He justifies himself. His words 
are alienating, but his hand and his eyes are soft, caressing. "Just the other 
day-surely you understand, given our situation-I had to give the order to 
shoot two of them, running through the forest like wild beasts. We have no 
light here, no generator. I gave the order to shoot them in the dark. What 
could I do?" We had been walking slowly toward the jeep parked in the 
front yard, still holding hands. Pascal is intelligent, articulate. I feel as if 
I'm sinking. Pascal says he hopes to see me again. I collect a sense of his 
confiding tone, as if I were privy to secrets, as if I alone can understand 
him, as if he knows this. I clamber into the jeep, and off we go. 
My colleagues ask me what we discussed and I give them the 
substance. They reply with scorn, with words such as "absence of any rule 
of law," "revenge-killings," and so on. I only half listen, feeling an acute 
sense of loss .... 
Boston, U.S.A.: summer, 2004. I reflect upon the above incidents, 
which took place almost ten years ago. And yet, there it is, this memory 
cropping up in a discussion of genocide discourses. Why here, and why 
now? My analysis of genocide and its discourses has touched upon the 
eroticization of death within two contexts: first, the eroticism as a specific 
and encoded sexual encounter between two consenting parties, and second, 
the discourse on genocide as erotic dispositif in terms of the construction of 
the parties, self and other in specific, coded ways. The incidents described 
above, the "memoir" moment of this text, belong neither to the dispositif 
nor to the discourse on genocide, properly speaking. 
And yet, they suggest an erotic dimension to the lived experience of the 
human rights encounter, or the context within which the discourse on 
genocide, specifically the law, is deployed and operationalized. The stories 
represent a sort of private space that interrupts the public sphere within 
which my role and Pascal's are dictated by the mission. Nevertheless, the 
moment with Pascal, whether described as lust, or love's potential, or 
simply human contact, and whether borne of physical attraction regardless 
of the context, or attraction because of the context-the starvation for a 
connection, the longing to bridge the narrative gaps between us, the 
kinkiness of fancying a man in uniform, the juxtaposition of tenderness 
with the violence of his words, his role-is a kind of refusal, transgressive, 
however muted. 
But even had the attraction been consummated in sex, it would, in 
material terms, simply have been an erotic encounter between consenting 
parties, notwithstanding the surrounding context: death, violence, 
disaggregated narratives. Neither would it have any real effect on the 
discourse of genocide as such; the mission would still go on, reports would 
still be written, international legal standards would still apply and be 
shaped by their application and implementation in Rwanda. (For instance, 
there would be others in the chain of authority beyond me and Pascal who 
would contest Pascal's story of an "ongoing genocide" as justification for 
the denial of due process to suspected interahamwe, because the legal 
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definition of genocide had already been determined to apply to events in 
Rwanda that did not extend beyond July 1994). 
So I tell these stories not to suggest something new about the erotic-
death complex, nor something further about the discourse on genocide, but 
rather to suggest the limits of those narrative mechanisms, those codes or 
barriers which function as rule and command. Perhaps someone less 
desperate for connection, less psychologically or sexually pliable (I 
concede noting, naturally), would not have been affected by Jacques or 
Pascal, and would be none the worse for it; he would have continued in 
role. And to be sure, my emotions as I watched Jacques and his lover, as 
well as my conduct with Pascal, were merely the playing out of alternative 
roles, not the revelation of some core, stable essence of my self. Each 
moment called for a different mapping of borders and centers, none of 
which would have made a difference to the discourse on genocide. 
But that is precisely the point in these stories: as memoir, they interfere 
with the narrative flow even of this text, its generalities regarding the erotic 
encounter when played out in a field of pain and death (to use Robert 
Cover's phrase regarding the law), or when seen from the vantage point of 
the borders of innocence. Memoir asks you to reconfigure the self and 
other, to recenter the self in its relation to the other by incorporating the 
other. Fusion, borderlessness (deterritoriality), ego-lessness, are at one 
extreme of this reconfiguration. Whereas the code (eroticized death) ends 
in fusion or its violent renunciation and abjection, the discourse normalizes 
the mantle of self-virtue and the expulsion of violence to the "out there" in 
order to achieve, once again, disaggregated self and other. In other words, 
both device and discourse contain an inherent longing for connection; 
whether in the first as the dream of fusion or, in the second, in the attempt 
to collect, incorporate and aggregate the plethora of voices, instruments, 
and players regarding the operation of the law within the context of 
genocide. It is an attempt that left a thirst for contact and connectedness, 
for continuity between nationalities, languages, races, and other barriers. 
The law, in short, was one-size-fits-all, and we strove to fulfill this promise 
(in part by a suppression of the erotic). 
The incidents at Ntarama and in Ruhengheri held out the possibility of 
transcending the barriers. Just because the erotic moments or intimations 
occurred within the context of death does not mean they are ipso facto 
examples of the erotic device. On the contrary, these moments-and the 
memoir style within the context of an analytical piece-suggest the 
discontinuity that is requisite to critiquing the discourse (and, by analogy, 
the device). 
But discontinuity per se is not the solution being proposed here. As 
noted, a critique of the juridical discourse will allow us to take account of 
our investment in the violence of the other, the violence "out there." In 
order to achieve that object, one must reconfigure the borders that create a 
sense of the innocence and guilt of self and other respectively. As such, 
merely substituting "discontinuity" as the law's dream instead of 
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continuity/fusion, is to propose a dream that the law already 
accommodates: witness the disaggregation of the narratives that on their 
own lead to a sense of alienation, even as the law as a discourse is being 
operationalized, implemented on the ground. The law allows for 
uncertainty and ambiguity, for the eruption of the erotic moment, the secret 
sexual liaison. Loneliness and a feeling of despair in the face of the 
enormity of genocide by itself does not "critique" the discourse, on the 
contrary, it only means, at least in part, that there will be the assurance of a 
turnover in the workforce. 
The promise of fusion, or the promise of narrative aggregation-the 
law's desire for unity and uniformity-is not itself the initial focus of 
attention, and is therefore not itself critiqued by the eruption of the erotic in 
moments such as those suggested in the stories from the field. Rather, 
memoir invites a view of eroticism at the molecular level, to return the self 
to its ambivalence, and to reconsider the self's potential for connection or 
abjection. By extension, if the discourse on genocide, the one in which we 
are engaged as we deploy the law, as we engage in the "semantic debate," 
maintains the a priori self/other relationship--by such mechanisms as the 
will to (and failure of) fusion-that we locate the critique and ask whether 
and how we might reconfigure the borderline between them. 
The analysis of the discourse is a three-tiered process. First, I have 
looked at the operation of the discourse, and the disciplinarity, if you will, 
of the erotic within the context of death and suffering. How does the self 
see the other across the border (law) as the repository of its antagonism 
(alterity)? I have suggested that the self is encoded with the law's fantasy, 
which allows the law to accommodate and/or suppress the eruption of the 
erotic as connectedness or love, i.e., as the anomaly, within itself. The 
eruptions are offered as evidence of the possibility of an escape from the 
encoded discourse. 
There are two ways in which the moments as "return to the self' 
critique the discourse: one is internal, the other external. The internal 
critique goes something like this: the law is able to accommodate 
uncertainty and ambiguity, at a cost. The cost is the energy expended in 
maintaining the discursive borders by suppressing these moments, or 
ridding itself of the parties that engage in this subversive or transgressive 
behavior vis-a-vis the operation of law. The stories of the moments, 
therefore, suggest that the derepression of these moments is itself a 
clarification of the way the law works, the way it maintains its fantasy of 
unities and the Negative, even as it imbibes and colonizes the Ethical with 
respect to the makeup of the self in its relation to the world. 
The second, or external, critique suggests that these moments of an 
erotic eruption provide an alternative model to the operation of the law, 
provide a model of flows and multiplicity, of disunity of discourse, and 
allow all stories to constitute the juridical discourse (whereupon Pascal's 
alternative definition of genocide would carry weight, at a cost to the law's 
requirement that suspects be accorded due process). If we characterize 
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those erotic moments as the promise of love, of real connectedness within 
an alienated discursive desert (apply the law, strengthen the parapets, 
maintain the borders), then an alternative model of flows becomes 
appealing. 
Both, however, have their weaknesses: if the law already 
accommodates ambiguities by rewriting or suppressing them, this merely 
speaks to the evolution of the law. If there was a critical mass of erotic 
eruptions-let's say sex was rampant, and the lovers insisted that their 
Pascals were right and the official record was wrong-surely the law would 
shape itself to this reality. In the particular context, the law would carve 
out an exception: in Rwanda, the incursions of the interahamwe from 
across the border are so pervasive as to redefine the territorial and temporal 
jurisdiction of the courts adjudicating the crime of genocide, without 
necessarily changing the legal definition or the discourse. In other words, 
the internal critique, at least as posited by the erotic eruption, says 
somethin,a about what the law already does, 143 but may not critique the law 
as such. 1 
The second, external critique suffers from a similar weakness. If the 
alternative model of flows were indeed realized, its logical conclusion 
would be fusion, notwithstanding that unity or fusion may not be the 
ostensible object of the model of flows and multiplicity. 145 To be sure, 
intimations of fusion within the flows may be J'rovisional, contingent, 
fragile, but the possibility of a mystical totality, 14 as Freud put it, would 
remain immanent, haunting the discourse of flows as it enabled many more 
perspectives and voices to be heard. If fusion is then the spectral object of 
the model, at the end of the day it too is no different from the operation of 
the discourse as engine or basis for the system as stasis (antagonism). 
143 An example from the domestic context is provided by MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: 
A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S CENSORSHIP WARS 1-2 (1993): 
Sex, sin, and blasphemy became major political issues-in the real world but also, 
increasingly, in the world of art and imagination. Symbols, words, ideas, and images were 
being blamed for social ills. If only America could rid itself of all those pesky artists, all that 
crude and irreverent and sometimes violent popular entertainment, surely our social 
problems would fade away. And so 'censorship' became a key word in political debate. 
Id. at I. Heins goes on to argue, "Does the First Amendment give absolute protection to freedom of 
speech? Though the words of the amendment are unequivocal-'Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech'-society and the courts have always recognized exceptions .... " Id. 
at 1-2. 
144 There is of course the argument that the law, in this exercise, not only reforms itself from within 
( exceptionality), but also, paradoxically, exhausts itself and is thereby enervated, static, by continually 
combating internal ex-juridical irruptions of the id or unconscious. 
145 The object, at least one of them, may be absorption. "The means of the private and individual 
apprehension of values are dissolved: with the appearance of Empire, we are confronted no longer with 
the local mediations of the universal but with a concrete universal itself." HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 
30, at 19. (emphasis added). 
146 Both senses of fusion relate to religion. For Hegel, the "Absolute Mind" is rationality divorced from 
faith, a transcendence. See, e.g., Alastair Hannay, Introduction to SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND 
TREMBLING 10 (Alastair Hannay trans., 1985). For Freud, the mystical totality or the "oceanic" 
expresses the religious experience, which he repudiates. See, e.g., FREUD, supra note 70, at 11. "It is a 
feeling which he [Romain Rolland in a letter to Freud] would like to call a sensation of 'eternity,' a 
feeling as of something limitless, unbounded-as it were, 'oceanic.'" Id. 
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What purpose, then, do the stories of erotic eruption provide? They 
permit a different perspective on the realization of the self, and by analogy, 
of the meaning of sovereignty. By their disruption or insistence within the 
juridical narrative (and their substantive absence, their discursive 
potentiality), they reflect upon the operation of the law in terms of the will 
to centrality, totality, and univocality. But further than that, if those 
moments represent the possibility of love, then they bend our attention to 
the lovers who, regardless of the basis of those feelings, suggest the space 
for feeling, for love at the borderline. The moments provide an alternative 
to the dispositif in its central vacuity within, and pursuant to, the juridical 
narrative, because the moments are inspired by a desire to connect rather 
than absorb and, through the failure of unity, to expunge. 147 
Following then is a closer look at borders as suggestive of that which 
lies beyond the desire for stability and boundedness: an examination of 
borders as porous with respect to the model of flows, and borders as porous 
with respect to the possibility of an opening-out to the other, a resituation 
(recentering) of the "otherness" within the self. 
IV. POROSITY 
A. THE NORMATIVITY OF STABLE BORDERS, UNDERMINED 
Ah, you who join house to house, 
who add field to field, 
until there is room for no one but you, 
and you are left alone in the midst of the landf 148 
In this section, I use the erotic moments in the above analysis of 
eroticism and the juridical narrative to examine the "stable" border between 
self and other in its alternative figurations. The main point will be that the 
maintenance of borders is in part a quest for purity. Genocide, or 
annihilatory violence, is the ultimate construction of borders, the ultimate 
quest for purity though violence. The investment in the discourse on 
genocide is the quest for purity through the specular displacement. 
As noted, the erotic moments suggested two ways of thinking about 
absence (suppression of the erotic) within the discourse. On the one hand, 
the moments themselves were wholly extrinsic to the discourse, the work 
of the mission continued apace. On the other, each moment expressed 
something about the self and its situation within the context of the human 
rights work or narrative: in the first story I experienced shame, and in the 
second, a sense of loss. 
Shame is a kind of "eye power," as Leon Wurmser describes it: "Seeing 
meant the ultimate defense against self-loss in merger, shame anxiety 
147 See, e.g., VOLF, supra note 20, at 79. "Hegemonic centrality" as analogous to the erotic device: "we 
p,enetrate in order to exclude, and we exclude in order to control-if possible everything, alone." Id. 
48 Isaiah 5:8. 
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pointed to the ultimate danger when such seeing was vanquished: 
disappearance." 149 In a sense, the shame expresses my violation of the 
discursive code within which the (ocular) moment occurred (the intertext, 
so to speak, of the story and the discourse), whereby my desire and envy 
threatened to swallow me within the transgression, to deny merger within 
the discursive code, and to exclude me. Shame anxiety, then, is a form of 
"rescue and restoration."150 I am returned to the discourse, to the mission, 
and to my ethical role, even as that role threatens to "disappear" me (a 
stipulation of the dream of fusion). 
Seeing, and the eroticism involved, is an escape from the encoded 
discourse, a return to the self (or self-interrogation). The second erotic 
moment, then, is experienced as a loss of the self as I return to the code, the 
recognition that the code represents my ultimate disappearance. But the 
importance of such moments is that one returns from oneself to the code 
with a different perspective. I take back with me the sense of shame, of 
loss; my own parameters have been altered, even if slightly, in relation to 
the code. The code's calibrations of my own boundaries are therefore 
subject to interrogation. The code's construction of the other as the 
repository of violence (the border around the other that segregates him) is 
no longer entirely tenable, and this is the caution, the pull, that prevents my 
disappearance through or within a narrative of innocence. 
But shame has also functioned as a form of purification. It returns me 
to the code, it warns me that I will be excommunicated unless I return to 
the code, it cautions me that the way to configure the border between self 
and other is to maintain the purity of the discourse and the innocence of the 
self. Anything else would be disruptive of the code, of "the way things 
are." My return, in shame, has brought with it the absence, or insistence, of 
an alternative or different way of seeing the relationship between self and 
other within the code. The absent alternative, if you will, clarifies the 
object of the code, i.e., its calibration of the relationship. 
The tension at the border, then, is between an openness to alternatives, 
which threatens the self with loss of community, and the suppression of, or 
closedness to, alternatives (purified code), which threatens the self with 
disappearance within the community. As such, the cycle of a visit to the 
self and the return to the code continually clarifies, even exacerbates, the 
porosity of the borderline, reiterates its constructedness, and engenders a 
complex of choices and ethical frameworks, such as flows or stasis, 
multiplicity or unity, as a function of the imbrication of self and other 
within the discourse. 
Writing about conflict, Kristeva notes that "[s]tability is provisional. It 
is the conflicts that are eternal because there is pleasure in conflict."151 Any 
conceptualization of the border must take this into account. Thus, both 
149 WURMSER, supra note 67, at 122. 
150 Id. at 122-23. 
151 JULIA KRISTEVA, REVOLT, SHE SAID 101 (Brian O'Keeffe trans., 2002). She continues: "The 
individual, in this return to him or herself, experiences division, conflict, pleasure and jouissance in this 
fragmentation. This is the modem version of psychic truth." Id. 
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visions of porosity that I will discuss here-the model involving flows, or 
the model involving the repentant, recentered self-may be viable 
provisionally, i.e., depend for their exercise on conflict, even as their teloi 
(totality or perpetual peace) are antithetical to conflict. 
Behind the competing visions of porosity lies the conception of borders 
as strong, resistant and established. Again, Kristeva: "Pleonexia, greed, is 
etymologically the desire 'to possess always more'; it connotes an appetite 
that cannot possibly be sated, and that links it, in the writings of Paul for 
instance, to sexual transgressions and flesh in general; for the cause of this 
appetite resides in idolatry as disobedience to divine speech."152 The visit 
to the self is thus envisaged as a form of pleonexia, an idolatry of the flesh 
that competes with the "divine speech" of the code (law as the "decision" 
of the sovereign153). The erotic self in transgression is the self that 
interrogates, but the norm of stable borders is strong and persuasive, 
valorizing the choice for decisional sovereign, the strong (secure) state. 
Indeed, the idea that a return to the self is transgressive suggests the power 
of the normativity of stable borders. 
Thus, we have three considerations· with respect to the border. First, 
there is the stable border, solid and impermeable. Then, there is the porous 
border conceived in two different ways: on the one hand, porosity is 
contingent, the wall opening up only insofar as it permits the entry to the 
center, to reconstitute it as an interdependence of self and other. This is the 
theological view. On the other hand, porosity is imagined as a continuous 
state, whereby self and other engage in endless, circular flows of desire, a 
stream of subjects "decentered and deterritorializing."154 In the first, a 
model of "recentering" is proposed; in the second, a model of "re-
territorialization." Porosity, then, is imagined as different visions of an 
escape from the normative framework of the stable, unsealable border. 
The stable border is normative precisely because of a fear that the 
border can be traversed. Thus, scalability is cast as transgressive, 
idolatrous. But witness what happens to the self as stabilized by the wall, 
or code: stability leads to "hegemonic centrality," because it involves 
exclusion. An example is provided by Volf: "The fate of the indigenous 
population [of North America] at the hands of the colonizers is not unique; 
it is the extreme example of a stable pattern," whereupon Volf quotes from 
Isaiah's judgment upon "those who dispossess and drive out others so that 
they alone can be the masters of the land."155 He continues: 
152 JULIA KRJSTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION 123 (Leon S. Roudiez trans., 
1982). 
153 SCHMITT, supra note 34, at 5. 
154 HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at xii-xiii: 
Id. 
It [i.e., Empire] is a decentered and deteritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively 
incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages 
hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of 
command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and 
blended in the imperial global rainbow. 
155 VOLF, supra note 20, at 78. As noted, this is also the model of Empire in its insatiable desire for 
absorption. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at xii. 
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We exclude because we want to be at the center and be there alone, 
single-handedly controlling "the land." To achieve such "hegemonic 
centrality," we add conquest to conquest and possession to possession; we 
colonize the life-space of others and drive them out; we penetrate in order 
to exclude, and we exclude in order to control-if possible everything, 
alone. 156 
The cycle of returns-to self, to code, and back again-articulates the 
normative pull of the code (stability), vests my self with a sense of stability, 
independence, and autonomy. As Jacqueline Rose puts it, the very spectre 
of traversion, of the "broken identity," more often than not leads to its 
opposite: "More simply, I am suggesting that the fixity of identity-for 
Freud, for any of us-is something from which it is very hard to escaRe "157 
going on to suggest that "[ f]ragmentation can engender petrification." ss 
In Qalqilya, West Bank, "the wall or fence or barrier-it is all these 
things in different places," is "transforming the physical and mental 
landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," writes Robert Cohen. 159 He 
quotes Tom Segev, a historian, to the effect that, '"There is a feeling that 
you cannot resolve this situation for the coming decades, you can only 
manage it. . . . The wall is ugly and terrible, but it is also a way of 
managing. "'160 On the other side of the fence, Mutassem Abu Tayem, a 
Palestinian farmer, with access to his farm only through a tunnel built under 
the fence, says, "'We are living in a prison and are treated like beasts. "'161 
The felt need for security under embattled conditions is very real, 
Cohen notes, 162 but so is the logic of identity-formation within the 
discourse of stable borders. Identity, under the code, tends toward fixity 
(petrification), the building of walls of protection that bolster the security 
and the hegemonic centrality of the self, leading to accumulation on the one 
hand and dispossession/exclusion on the other, which in turn leads to 
fragmentation between self and other, and so the cycle continues. 
The Israeli-Palestinian border, 430 miles long and projected to cost 
over $1 billion, has tunnels. Surely this suggests a kind of porosity? Or are 
they, like the law, the exceptions that prove the rule of stability? The 
tunnels are heavily guarded and monitored. In discussing the various ways 
people exclude, Volf notes two forms: exclusion by elimination (genocide 
156 VOLF, supra note 20, at 78-79. 
157 Jacqueline Rose, Response to Edward Said, in FREUD AND THE NON-EUROPEAN 63, 74 (2003). 
158 Id. at 76: "Fragmentation can engender petrification, just as it can be a consequence of historical 
alienation that a people, far from dispersing themselves, start digging for a history to legitimate the 
violence of the state." Id. 
159 Robert Cohen, Building for Calm by Giving Up on Peace, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, § 4, at 14, 





If Israelis are going to the beach and to clubs again, and if bombings have become rare, it is 
thanks in large part, they insist, to these ditches and guard towers and coils of barbed wire 
and miles of wire fencing that separate two peoples, demarcating the gulf between them .... 
A fence makes the task of Palestinians who want to kill them harder. 
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in Bosnia, Rwanda), 163 and exclusion by assimilation: "You can survive, 
even thrive, among us, if you become like us; you can keep your life, if you 
give up your identity ... exclusion by assimilation rests on a deal: we will 
refrain from vomiting you out (anthropoemic strategy) if you let us 
swallow you up (anthropophagic strategy)."164 Volf also notes exclusion by 
domination, 165 and exclusion by abandonment. 166 All, however, are forms 
of symbolic exclusion: "Before excluding others from our social world we 
drive them out, as it were from our symbolic world."167 
Volf thus advocates the development of "a complex notion of identity" 
that "includes the other."168 He then names exclusion as such as an 
"objective evil,"169 and as "sin," to wit: 
Sin is here the kind of purity that wants the world cleansed of the other 
rather than the heart cleansed of the evil that drives people out by calling 
those who are clean 'unclean' and refusing to help make clean those who 
are unclean. Put more formally, sin is 'the will to purity' turned away 
from the 'spiritual' life of the self to the cultural world of the other, 
transmuted from spirituality into 'politics' broadly conceived .... 170 
It is, then, "the pursuit of false purity,"171-of blood, territory, origins, 
and goals 172-that engenders exclusion, and the creation and maintenance 
of stable borders to keep the other out. Volf's enterprise is to "decenter" 
this "wronrl1-centered self," and to "recenter" the self "by being nailed to 
the cross." 
Now, although Volf's discussion of borders and exclusion is 
theological, I hope to suggest that in its outlines it provides three points 
germane to the discourse on genocide as a particular "code": first, there is a 
parallel, indeed a fit, between his definition of exclusion and the meaning 
163 VOLF, supra note 20, at 75. 
164 /d. 
165 Id. "We subjugate them so we can exploit them in order to increase our wealth or simply inflate our 
e&os." Id. 
1 Id. "Like the priest and the Levite in the story of the Good Samaritan, we simply cross to the other 
side and pass by, minding our own business." Id. 
167 Id. "Even where explicit and public exclusion is forbidden by formal rules, implicit and private 
exclusion still continues, often in the form of unconscious but nonetheless effectual aversion." Id. at 75 
n.5. 
Id. at 76. 
Symbolic exclusion is often a distortion of the other, not simply ignorance about the other. 
We demonize and bestialize not because we do not know better, but because we refase to 
know what is manifest and choose to know what serves our interests. That we nevertheless 
believe our distortions to be plain verities is no counter-argument; it only underlines that evil 
is capable of generating an ideational environment in which it can thrive unrecognized. 
168 Id. at 66. 
169 Id. at 68. "In my vocabulary, in any case, 'exclusion' does not express a preference; it names an 
obiective evil." Id. 
17rr/d at 74. 
171 Id. at 74. 
tn Id. 
Id. 
The origin and the goal, the inside and the outside, everything must be pure: plurality and 
heterogeneity must give way to homogeneity and unity. One people, one culture, one 
language, one book, one goal; what does not fall under this all-encompassing 'one' is 
ambivalent, polluting, and dangerous. It must be removed .... 
173 Id. at 69. 
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of the code. Where Volf calls exclusion an "objective evil," I have 
suggested that the sex-death complex (code or dispositif) is "imperialistic" 
(lex imperii). Second, both have "colonized" the self. 174 Volf uses the 
language of evil and sin to describe exclusion, but in its operation the code 
leads to the spiral of evil engendered by the promise of purity and 
"petrified" identity, especially in the context of conflict. 175 Third, although 
Volf's perspective is religious, which means that he stipulates to basic 
definitions of right and wrong, good and evil, he recognizes that the views 
espousing the "evil" of exclusion as concomitant with a system of 
oppression and hierarchy is historical, that it comes "from below," just as 
much as the critique of the code is anti-imperialistic, 176 or the subaltern's 
discourse. In addition, both critiques have in common an escape from 
oppression (or, more exactly, self-oppression) by an interrogative "return to 
the self."177 
Because the theological enterprise takes the same critical stance toward 
the code and its insistence on stable borders, it is interesting to see how that 
critique unfolds, and where it ends up. The religious (or more properly 
speaking, the Christian), critique of the self begins with the necessity of 
borders (and as such is in agreement with the code and radically differs 
from the postmodernists with respect to porosity), but suggests that those 
borders be "open" in a particular way. It ends, I suggest, with the 
institution of an alternative, bordered universe, a universe of eternal peace 
and the terrifying prospect of immortality. I shall compare this with the 
postmodern calibration of a borderless world and its telos in a different 
kind of totality: the transcendence of identity and of death. 
174 Id. at 89. 
Why are we such docile, even enthusiastic captives to the system of exclusion? Why is there 
so little need for surveillance and force? Why are the subtle disciplinary mechanisms so 
effective, to use a phrase of Michel Foucault? Because our very selves have been shaped by 
the climate of evil in which we live. Evil has insinuated itself into our very souls and rules 
over us from the very citadel erected to guard us against it. 
Id. Also, "If people acquiesce, it is not because they are forced to acquiesce, but because there is 
something in the texture of their selves that resonates with the logic of exclusion." This relates to 
creating borders: "The formation and negotiation of identity always entails the drawing of boundaries, 
the setting of the selfas distinct from the other .... " Id. at 90---91. 
175 Id. at 99. 
Id. 
The stronger the conflict, the more the rich texture of the social world disappears and the 
stark exclusionary polarity emerges around which all thought and practice aligns itself. No 
other choice seems available, no neutrality possible, and therefore no innocence sustainable . 
. . . Tragically enough, over time the polarity has a macabre way of mutating into its very 
opposite-into 'both us and them' that unites the divided parties in a perverse communion of 
mutual hate and mourning over the dead. 
176 Id. at 100. 
Id. 
As I read the Christian Scripture, a good deal of its message is written from below, from the 
perspective of those who in some sense suffer at the hand of the mighty. The Hebrew 
prophets make the injustice of the "little people" into the primary lens through which they 
view the mighty, and in God's name they demand that the mighty mend their ways. 
177 Id. at 92. "It is in the citadel of the fragile self that the new world of embrace is first created." 2 
Corinthians 5: 17. 
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B. NON-EXCLUSIONARY BORDERS 
Volf begins with the question of borders. First, Volf suggests that we 
are dialogical beings, the self always and already in relation to the other: 
"as Paul Ricoeur has argued in Oneness and Another, 'the selfhood of 
oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be 
thought of without the other."178 Second, contrary to Michel Foucault and 
other postmodernists, who would "level all the boundaries,"179 Volf 
suggests that "Adequate reflection on exclusion must satisfy two 
conditions: (1) it must help to name exclusion as evil with confidence 
because it enables us to imagine nonexclusionary boundaries that map 
nonexclusionary identities; at the same time (2) it must not dull our ability 
to detect the exclusionary tendencies in our own judgments and 
practices."180 
There are two elements to Volf's development of nonexclusionary 
boundaries: differentiation ("separating-and-binding") and judgment. A 
third is the specification of the meaning of exclusion as sin, or as the 
creation of "impenetrable barriers that prevent a creative encounter with the 
other. They are a result either of expulsion or indifference."181 With 
respect to differentiation, Volf suggests that separation, by itself, "would 
result in self-enclosed, isolated and self-identical beings." When combined 
with "binding," the lines of separation are also lines of connection, barriers 
as bridges. The Genesis story illustrates the point: 
At first there is a "formless void" (Genesis I :2); "everything in the 
universe is all jumbled together," writes Plantinga, and then continues: 
"So God begins to do some creative separating: he separates light from 
darkness, day from night, water from land, the sea creatures from the land 
cruiser ... At the same time God binds things together: he binds humans 
to the rest of creation as stewards and caretakers of it, to himself as 
bearers of his image, and to each other as perfect complements."182 
Thus, "boundaries are part of the creative process of differentiation. 
For without boundaries there would be no discrete identities, and without 
discrete identities there could be no relation to the other."183 Without 
boundaries there would only be absorption, the erasure (exclusion) of the 
otherness of the other. 
178 VOLF, supra note 20, at 66. 
179 Id. at 62-63. "Foucault shares a distaste for boundaries with other postmodern thinkers, such as 
Jacques Derrida or Gilles Deleuze .... A consistent drive toward inclusion seeks to level all the 
boundaries that divide and to neutralize all outside powers that form and shape the self," noting that 
"Radical indeterminacy of negative freedom is a stable correlate of a consistent drive toward inclusion 
that levels all boundaries." Id. As such, the struggle against exclusion, where it envisages the erasure 
of boundaries, "consists in falling into the abyss of nonorder in which the struggle against exclusion 
implodes on itself because, in the absence of all boundaries, we are unable to name what is excluded or 
why it ought not to be excluded .... " Id. at 64. Volf also asks, "Does not such radical indeterminacy 
undermine from within the idea of inclusion, however? I believe it does. Without boundaries we will 
be able to know only what we are fighting against but not what we are fighting for." Id. at 63. 
180 Id. at 64. 
181 Id. at 67. 
182 Id. at 65. 
183 Id. at 67. 
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Exclusion is countermanded by differentiation (separation and 
binding), and judgment. Whereas judgment is generally "deemed an act of 
exclusion,"184 to be repudiated along with other kinds of boundary (for the 
postmodemists in their quest for inclusion), Volf attempts to distinguish the 
two: in effect, judgment is in fact "the distinction between 'differentiation' 
and 'exclusion,"' i.e., some judgments, as with boundaries, are good 
(nonexclusionary), others bad (exclusionary). For the postmodemists such 
as Richard Rorty, borders and judgments are eliminated when we concede 
that all are contingent and oppressive. Volf replies that "contingency does 
not, as [Rorty] puts it, go 'all the way down,' and that there are values 
which 'time and change' cannot alter because 'time and change' did not 
bring them about."185 Precisely one of those judgments is that exclusion 
(rather than differentiation) is defined as an "objective evil."186 
Whereupon, "[a] judgment that names exclusion as an evil and 
differentiation as a positive good, then, is itself not an act of exclusion. To 
the contra~7 such judgment is the beginning of the struggle against exclusion." 
The crux of the difference between Volf and the postmodemists, or 
between their competing visions of porosity, is precisely in the different 
positive content (or lack of content) of those visions. Whereas the 
postmodemists depend upon a negative frame of reference, indeed a 
negative center of the self (decentered selves), 188 Volf and the Christians 
suggest the opposite: the self is always centered, always in dialogical 
relation to the other, and always in the creative process of maintaining a 
center. 189 The belief in a centered self is antipodal to the belief in a 
decentered self. Indeed, it is this idea of the self as a vessel, a container, 
which is radically different from the postmodern project. This is also 
evident in Volf's definition of the borders, at every point taking the 
negative index and infusing it with substance: separation (negative) is 
coupled with binding (positive); judgment (exclusion, negative) is coupled 
with values, or the positive belief in the evil of exclusion ~not just its 
contingency) and in the stipulation of "right and wrong beliefs." 90 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 68 (quoting RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xv (1989)). 
186 Id. "! reject exclusion because the prophets, evangelists, and apostles tell me that this is a wrong 
way to treat human beings, any human being, anywhere, and I am persuaded to have good reasons to 
believe them." Id. 
181 Id. 
188 Id. at 70. "If there is no center to the self, then there are only different ways of weaving new 
candidates for belief and desire into antecedently existing webs of belief and desire." Id. (quoting 
RORTY, supra note 185, at xv). Volfadds, "The ironic stance is a posture ofa centerless self." Id. 
189 Id. 
Id. 
Though the self may lack an 'objective' and 'immovable' center, the self is never without a 
center; it is always engaged in the production of its own center. 'Weaving' would be a rather 
innocent way to describe this production, possibly a fitting image for how Rorty's books are 
written but not for how human selves are shaped. 'Struggle' and 'violence' come closer to 
being an adequate description. 
190 Id. at 69. "[T]here are right and wrong beliefs and desires, not only antecedent and subsequent 
beliefs and desires." Id. 
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The self's center is constituted by those negative indexes without the 
balance of the positive ones. This is why, for the postmodernists, it is a 
"decentered self': it is constituted by exclusion. That is, the 
postmodernists make two moves: they define all borders as disciplinary and 
oppressive, and advocate their erasure; and they define the self as 
constituted by these disciplinary measures, thereby eliminating, along with 
"essential essences," any center altogether: the self is pure contingency. 
The self is the Negative: it is not. It is empty, pure "irony," in Rorty's 
terms. For the postmodernists, this is its strength: the negative is freedom 
(negative liberty, freedom from the oppressiveness of borders). But for 
Volf, decenteredness as the Negative means, in effect, a centeredness 
constituted by exclusion itself. Thus, to counteract the Negative, the first 
move is to define the Negative, to make a judgment (a boundary) based on 
an a priori value system, to mark the limit of the Negative with a positive 
value. That move is to define "decenteredness" as in fact the "wrongly-
centered" self. And that move has been anticipated by defining exclusion 
itself as an objective evil. If the self as "decentered" is the Negative, then a 
fortiori it has already excluded all, including the other: it is in fact 
constituted by exclusion. In a word, the self is "centered" by evil. 
Volf's project is to decenter this self and recenter it; that is, to fill it 
with content, or rather, with a substantively Positive value to defeat the 
Negative. 191 As a wrongly-centered (or decentered) self it is, qua 
exclusion, prey to the two performances (enactments) of emptiness: 
accumulation and dispossession. It is the very model, in short, of the fixed 
and stable border, of the imperialist self. This is the substance of Volf's 
critique of the postmoderns: that the very model of inclusion, based upon a 
philosophy of negative liberty, 192 advocated by emptying the self of 
content-eradicating all boundaries, locating contingency "all the way 
down," articulating the self, the "I," in flows and transient inscriptions, the 
self utterly free to weave its own beliefs and desires-is in fact the 
fulfillment of the imperialist drive. The decentered self is the code. 
The opposite of this self constituted by exclusion and severance is the 
self that is committed and bound: instead of freedom, love. 193 But this is 
191 Id. at 70. "Whichever way the 'centering' takes place and whatever its result, the self should be de-
centered, claims Paul. The word he uses to describe the act is 'crucified,' a word which tells a story 
whose high points are Good Friday and Easter." Id. Also, "[t]he self is both 'de-centered' and 're-
centered' by one and the same process, by participating in the death and resurrection of Christ through 
faith and baptism." Id. 
192 Id. at 102. 
Both liberal and socialist projects-the two major visions for organizing social life under the 
conditions of modemity---center on the idea of freedom. As Zygmunt Bauman observed in 
Postmodern Ethics, the Grand Idea at the heart of modern restlessness, [the] guiding lantern 
perched on the prow of modernity's ship, was the idea of emancipation: an idea which draws 
its meaning from what it negates and against which it rebels-from the shackles it wants to 
fracture, the wounds it wants to heal-and owes its allure to the promise of negation. 
Id. As such, "Oppression is the negativity, liberation its negation, freedom the resulting positivity." Id. 
193 Volf suggests substituting this "negative" quality with something positive: 
The categories 'oppression/liberation' seem ill-suited to bring about reconciliation and 
sustain peace between people and people groups .... As a consequence, we need to reject 
'freedom' as the ultimate social goal. ... The father of Latin American Liberation Theology, 
Gustavo Gutierez, was right to insist that love, not freedom is ultimate. 
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not so simple, and herein lies the rub. Recentering the self requires a return 
to the self that is described by some as "destroying,"194 others (including 
Volt) as a "crucifixion." And in that word is packed all the violence and 
passion that is required of the self to overcome the Negative. 
In large, historical and political terms, the self has been battered; 
indeed, Volf suggests that the tendency to exclude-including the exclusion 
or escape from one's own traumatized self-is often a consequence of 
having suffered exclusion from others, 195 just as the tendency to "petrify" is 
a result of the trauma of self-fragmentation, especially within the context of 
conflict. Cohen suggests that Israelis, terrorized and exhausted by the 
suicide bombs, were by and large grateful for the wall, even if it was 
merely a form of "damage limitation"; but the cost of the panacea, of 
course, is that they have given up the hope for peace. 196 The first critique 
of Volf, then, is that the decentered self, the self that is in fact continuous 
with the code (the self from which I experienced shame as I momentarily, 
in a moment of lust, "escaped" it), is the product of strongly felt and 
perdurable historical and cultural forces. To give up that self, to relinquish 
the desire for stable borders, the quest for fusion and a self that belongs to a 
community by blood, soil, origin, or goal, to open the wall to the other, is in 
fact revolutionary; it is a violent and radical act. It is an act of renunciation 
(renouncing the flesh, the I as the engineer of change197). 
Id. at 104-05. 
194 Id. at 70: "'Destroying' is the word Reinhold Niebuhr used in The Nature and Destiny of Man to 
render Paul's 'crucifying.'" Volf suggests that the word is "too radical, for Paul clearly has in view a 
continued life of that same self after its 'crucifixion."' Id. 
195 Id. at 92. 
Id. 
The desire for identity could also explain why so many people let themselves be sinned 
against so passively-why they Jet themselves be excluded. It is not simply because they 
may lack a sufficiently strong will to be themselves, but because one can satisfy the will to 
be oneself by surrendering to the other. Their problem is not so much exclusion of the other 
from their will to be oneself, but a paradoxical exclusion of their own self from the will to be 
oneself-what feminist theologians call 'diffusion of the self' (Saiving 1979, 37f.). As a 
rule, exclusion of the self from the will to be oneself comes about as a result of acts of 
exclusion that we suffer. Hence it is not so much sin as it is an evil that cries for remedy. 
The exclusion of the self from the will to be oneself not only damages the self, but makes the 
slippage into exclusion on the part of the other and therefore further damaging of the self so 
much easier. 
196 Cohen, supra note 159. 
Id. 
Most Israelis are tired of the conflict, exhausted by it. They want to forget what goes on 
over there, in the West Bank. A wall helps them do that. They feel peace was within reach 
in the l 990's, but now the best that can be hoped for is damage limitation. A fence makes 
the task of Palestinians who want to kill them harder. 
197 VOLF, supra note 20, at 110. 
Id. 
For Christian faith to give up the hope for the final reconciliation-for reconciliation that 
can neither be surpassed nor undone-would mean to give itself up. Everything depends, 
however, on how we understand the final reconciliation and its implications for life in a 
world of enmity. I will offer here only three brief disclaimers. First, the final reconciliation 
is not a work of human beings but of the triune God. Second, it is not an apocalyptic end of 
the world but the eschatological new beginning of this world. Third, the final reconciliation 
is not a self-enclosed "totality" because it rests on a God who is nothing but a perfect love. 
The hope for such "nontotalitarian" final reconciliation is the backdrop against which 
Christians engage in the struggle for peace under the conditions of enmity and oppression. 
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The second critique regarding the project of porosity proposed by Volf 
is that the self as Negative, notwithstanding the will to death (nothingness) 
it adumbrates, has enabled hybridity, multiplicity, human rights, and 
freedom. It may be a negative freedom, and radically flawed for its false 
promises or the underside of self-alienation, but Volf concedes its benefits: 
To a person, such as myself, who experienced 'all the blessings' of 
communist rule, the suggestion that there is no truth to the liberal 
narrative of inclusion and the claim that its consequences are mainly 
unfortunate sounds not only unpersuasive but dangerous. Similarly, most 
women and minorities would not want to give up the rights they now 
have; and most critics of liberal democracies would rather live in a 
democracy than in any of the available alternatives. The ~rogress of 
'inclusion' is one important thing to celebrate about modernity. 98 
The project whereby "[t]hose who are conveniently left out of the modern 
narrative of inclusion because they disturb the integrity of its 'happy 
ending' plot demand a long and gruesome counter-narrative of 
exclusion"199 is true. And even they, traumatized by conflict, trodden 
underfoot by hegemons, or disenfranchised even within the enlightened 
democracies, will not easily give up the story of inclusion and its promises. 
The third critique of the project of love subtends its own content. We 
exclude, we judge, in "the pursuit of false purity," as Volf says. And yet, 
we live in a material world of dangers and compromises: openness to the 
other may still require us to secure our homes and persons frqm the threat 
of violation. It is true that conflict exacerbates the tendencies toward 
closedness of identity, but even in the "rich texture of the social world"200 I 
face the possibility of my own disappearance in small ways. 
A fourth critique, probably the most obvious to the secular mind, is the 
question of repentance. If I acknowledge that I am filled with sin (the 
Negative), and must repent, then redemption comes in the form of a 
particular belief system and access to a new community, indeed, a new 
code. I must be "born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, 
by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever."201 This code, like 
the old one, has bordered selves (but the borders are "nonexclusionary") 
and centered subjects (but the center is filled with "self-giving love"202). Its 
positive content, like the negative emptiness of the old code, also holds the 
promise of stabili!Y and fusion with God, and with the brethren of 
"unfeigned love."203 It promises forgiveness and reincorporation for the sin 
of transgression (my moment of shame), especially for the transgression of 
traversing the spiritual will to purity by excluding the other on the basis of 
culture or politics (false purity, false judgment). Its telos is the life 
hereafter. "For now we see through a glass, darkly, but then face to face: 
198 Id. at 59. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 99. 
201 I Peter I :23. 
202 VOLF, supra note 20, at 71. "For Christians, this 'decentered center' of self-giving love-most firmly 
centered and most radically open-is the doorkeeper of the self." Id. 
203 I Peter I :22. 
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now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known."204 
The discursive, material, and imperialist code, meanwhile, also has its 
telos, through an eroticization of the violence of the I, in death. 
Despite these critiques or, depending on one's point of view because of 
them (and the immanence they promise), the beauty of Volf's project is in 
what it permits us to apprehend about the discursive code, about ourselves, 
about the potential and the choices, that there are in fact choices with 
respect to our situation within the code. The project clarifies the "passivity 
beyond passivity"205 of the code and the possibility, indeed the urgency, of 
active engagement with the juridical discourse, the self, and alterity-
antagonism. 
Thus, Volf's project of a return to the self may on the one hand be 
similar to the yearning for stable borders (as in the discourse on genocide) 
but characterizes "exceptions" as the neutral space within which the self is 
permitted, albeit violently, to encounter its alterity. It is the antagonistic 
struggle as "agon,"206 in Mouffe's expression. Volf meets the violence of 
the code with a violence of its own, a turning away from the other as 
violence (exporting or displacing the violence to the other "out there," 
intervening to "redeem" the other), a turning toward the other as other in 
dialogical relation to the self; it is the violence of the recentered and 
interrogating self (crucifixion, repentance,207 self-redemption). 
But the porosity proposed by postmodernism, and critiqued by Volf, 
also has some common elements with the code (stable borders), as well as, 
perhaps counterintuitively, with Volf's project. The theological posit of 
porosity is an escape from exclusionary borders and returns eroticism to 
love beyond the self (God, the hereafter). The secular postmodern proposal 
similarly takes the self beyond self-interrogation to a oneness with nature 
and the universal.208 In the following, I will briefly outline how 
postmodernism, and in particularly Hardt and Negri's critique of the 
postmodern sovereign, shares with Volf's vision specific fundamental 
elements: each involves a form of what Edward Said refers to as 
204 1Corinthians13:12. 
205 GILLIAN ROSE, MOURNING BECOMES THE LAW: PHILOSOPHY AND REPRESENTATION 13-14 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) "Levinasian 'passivity beyond passivity', the idea of ethics as the ego-
less substitution of one for 'the other."' Id. 
206 MOUFFE, supra note 61, at 4. 
201 Volf defines repentance as follows: 
But he [Jesus] demanded more than a radical alteration. To repent means to make a 
turnabout of a profound moral and religious import. Repentance implies not merely a 
recognition that one has made a bad mistake, but that one has sinned. Jesus stated explicitly 
that he came 'to call not the righteous but the sinners' and the evangelists report that he was 
engaged in the practice of 'forgiving sins.' 
VOLF, supra note 20, at 113. 
208 See, e.g., Seem, supra note 138, at xxi: 
Id. 
Once we forget about our egos a non-neurotic form of politics becomes possible, where 
singularity and collectivity are no longer at odds with each other, and where collective 
expressions of desire are possible. Such a politics does not seek to regiment individuals 
according to a totalitarian system of norms, but to de-normalize and de-individualize through 
a multiplicity of new, collective arrangements against power. Its goal is the transformation 
of human relationships in a struggle against power. 
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"askesis"209 (renunciation): in Volf, it is repentance, whereas in the secular 
critiques it is "deterritoriality1" ego-lessness. Both critiques of the code depend upon a transcendenf 0 being, whether the Messiah or the Anti-
Oedipus, for purification and redemption.211 Both also, even as they 
critique the code, replicate many of its basic elements, such as an ultimate 
vision of stability and, indeed, fusion (freedom and/or love).212 And finally, 
both are religious or quasi-religious responses to the problem of the self 
and its relationship to the other. This should not be surprising; as Benedict 
Anderson has noted, "The extraordinary survival over thousands of years of 
Buddhism, Christianity or Islam in dozens of different social formations 
attests to their imaginative response to the overwhelmin¥.i burden of human 
suffering-disease, mutilation, grief, age, and death."2 He goes on to 
note, "The great weakness of all evolutionary/progressive styles of thought, 
not excluding Marxism, is that such questions are answered with impatient 
silence."214 On the contrary, however, I suggest that 
evolutionary/progressive thought-notwithstanding Freud's famous 
dismissal of religion215-to the extent at least that such thought is 
exegetical it borrows from religion's "imaginative response" to human 
woes. 
209 SAID, supra note 14, at 14. See also various definitions of "ascesis," available at 
www.sicetnon.com/textflorilegium/ascesis.htm (last visited July 21, 2004). '"To overflow,' that is the 
secret liquid passion, the one that knows no measure. And over-flowing does not signify plenitude, but 
emptiness, the excess by comparison to which fullness is still lacking." (citation omitted). Id. 
21° For the connection between fusion/unity and transcendence, see, e.g., GARY B. MADISON & MARTY 
FAIRBAIRN,THE ETHICS OF POSTMODERNITY: CURRENT TRENDS IN CONTINENTAL THOUGHT 9 
(Northwestern Univ. 1999). 
Id. 
Charles Scott addresses one of the longstanding issues in ethical theory: transcendence. He 
seeks to put thoroughly in question the sense of transcendence that is our philosophical 
heritage in order to maximize the struggle in it, to interrupt the powerful suggestion of unity 
that the sense of transcendence often carries with it. 
211 See, e.g., Seem, supra note 138, at xxiii. 
Id. 
Anti-Oedipus is an individual or a group that no longer functions in terms of beliefs and that 
comes to redeem mankind, as Nietzsche foresaw, not only from the ideals that weighed it 
down, 'but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to 
nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision that liberates the will 
again and restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man; this AntiChrist and antinihilist 
.... He must come one day.' (citation omitted). 
212 See, e.g., id. for the similarity between the erotic device and the anti-oedipal: with the 
"oedipalization of desire" comes "the effusion in it of a death instinct [that must be] exorcise[ d]" by the 
anti-oedipal. This purification program is also expressed in the following: "The first task of the 
revolutionary, [Deleuze and Guattari] add, is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal 
yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs." Id. 
at xx-xxi. 
213 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF 
NATIONALISM 18 {Verso 1983). 
21• /d. 
215 See, e.g., FREUD, supra note 70, at 22. 
Id. 
The whole thing is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with a friendly 
attitude to humanity it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never be able 
to rise above this view of life. It is still more humiliating to discover how large a number of 
people living today, who cannot but see that this religion is not tenable, nevertheless try to 
defend it piece by piece in a series of pitiful rearguard actions. 
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As such, in the following, I suggest the points of commonality between 
all three "territorial," if you will, systems of address to the self: (a) the 
code's requirements for fixity and its promise of fusion; (b) Volf's "porous" 
borders, a porosity that largely promises a substantive alternative to the 
code; and (c) Hardt and Negri's critique of the postmodern sovereign's 
"porosity" that also represents another anti-imperialist alternative to the 
code. The alternatives see the code as both postmodern and imperialist, 
even as postmodern thought promises a "way out" of imperialism. Deleuze 
and Guattari, for instance, promise to discover "the desiring-machines that 
escape such codes ~i.e., the Oedipal as the imperial] as lines of escape 
leading elsewhere." 6 The task ahead is to conceive of a neutral space, an 
"elsewhere" that permits the self to face its alterity and, thereby, disinvest 
in the stabilizing displacement of its violence to the elsewhere. 
C. BORDERLESSNESS: RENUNCIATION AND REVOLUTION 
[SJ pace contributes to a feeling of coherence and safety; to be without a 
home is to be a refugee-bewildered, disoriented, psychically frozen. 
-John Lah?17 
Addressing the extent to which the postmodern vision of flows and 
hybridity is similar both to the discourse on genocide as a mode of 
imperialism and to the Christian return to the self requires, once more, a 
review of the erotic as a disciplinary dispositif.218 One indication of this 
common principle is found in Hardt and Negri's analysis of postmodern 
imperialism, and their insistence on the "newness" of the postmodern 
sovereign. Because of this newness, new tools are needed to contest it. It 
is within the rhetoric of newness that is found the religious or quasi-
religious dimension of their project. There, elements in common with 
Volf's proposal include messianism, secular repentance/renewal, and an 
ultimate vision of the oneness of mankind, a kind of fusion219 with its 
promise of stability. The (postmodern) concept of renunciation 
incorporates these elements. 
My argument here is that when we apprehend the redemptive register 
of the discourse on genocide, we may understand both how our ethical 
agency with respect to the other has been shaped by the discourse, and how 
the discourse intimates alternatives, within the gaps. Redeeming the other 
is what we do within the discourse, how we define and situate victims, 
216 Seem, supra note 138, at xvii. 
Id. 
Against the Oedipal and oedipalized territorialities (Family, Church, School, Nation, Party), 
and especially the territoriality of the individual, Anti-Oedipus seeks to discover the 
'deterritorialized' flows of desire, the flows that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes 
and the neuticized [sic] territorialities, the desiring-machines that escape such codes as lines 
of escape leading elsewhere. 
217 John Lahr, Down and Out: Twenty-Seven Characters in Search of a Play, THE NEW YORKER, May 
31, 2004, at 93. 
218 
"Disciplinary society is that society in which social command is constructed through a diffuse 
network of dispositifs or apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and productive 
Yiractices." HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 23. 
19 Empire evinces "the tendency toward the centralized and unitary regulation of both the world market 
and global power relations." Id. at 23. 
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martyrs, evildoers, and the juridical outsider capable of salvific 
intervention. Whereas Volf fights the violence with a violence from within 
(spiritual "purity of heart"), Hardt and Negri suggest using the violence 
within (we are constituted or im-mediated by the sovereign, it has 
exhausted time and space) to fight the violence without (supranational 
power of rule). Secular postmodemism promises a kind of fusion that 
transcends the border of difference, thereby overcoming the "psychically 
frozen" homelessness of the self. 
Postmodern hybridity (borderlessness) begins with the negation of self 
(Volf calls this "exclusion" pure and simple), but, unlike the dispositif, 
without the borders. The dispositif expunges the violence of the self to the 
other, whereupon it becomes a "redemptive" exercise to save the other 
imperial force deployed to bring civilization to the savages, and so on.220 
The postmodern sovereign does the same, through its colonization of space 
and time and, thereby, the "deterritorialization" of the self. The same 
gesture that enables the sovereign to co-opt the idealist or progressivist 
agenda also holds out the promise, for the self, of a renunciation. That is, 
the self may contest sovereignty through an "ethics of refusal."221 
One index of renunciation here is in Hardt and Negri's insistence that 
the postmodern or "total" sovereign is a new and radical break from the 
past, the old self: modem sovereignty marks "a paradigm shift,"222 and the 
sovereign is "a single power that overdetermines [all former structures of 
power], structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one 
common notion of right that is decidedly postcolonial and 
postimperialist. "223 The sovereign is "a new notion of right, or rather, a 
new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms 
and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve 
conflicts. "224 
This newness is also "ontological,"225 in the sense that it reveals the 
deep implication of the subjectivity of the self in relation to the sovereign. 
In effect, the subject is created by the sovereign: "Life has now become ... 
220 Volf describes this process thus: "Others become scapegoats, concocted from our own shadows as 
repositories for our sins and weaknesses so we can relish the illusion of our sinlessness and strength." 
VOLF, supra note 20, at 78. 
221 See, e.g., Tawia Ansah, Surprised by Sin: Human Rights and Universality, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. 
& COM. 307, 317 (2003). Hardt & Negri propose an alternative to refusal: 
Beyond the simple refusal, or as part of that refusal, we need also to construct a new mode 
of life and above all a new community. This project leads not toward the naked life of homo 
tantum but toward homohomo, humanity squared, enriched by the collective intelligence and 
love of the community. 
HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 204. 
222 HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 8. 
223 Id. at 9. 
22• Id. 
225 Id. at I 0. 
Id. 
While studying and critiquing the new forms of international and supranational law, then, we 
will at the same time be pushed to the heart of the political theory of Empire, where the 
problem of supranational sovereignty, its source of legitimacy, and its exercise bring into 
focus political, cultural, and finally ontological problems. 
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an object of power."226 It is also "exhaustive."227 It could not be more 
radical, nor more in line with Schmitt's absolute state.228 That is, the 
ethical agenda of the modem sovereign is the same: "The traditional 
concept of just war involves the banalization of war and the celebration of 
it as an ethical instrument." Secularism attempted to expunge these 
concepts, but "[t]hese two traditional characteristics have reappeared in our 
postmodern world: on the one hand, war is reduced to the status of police 
action, and on the other, the new power that can legitimately exercise 
ethical functions through war is sacralized. "229 Coupled, then, with the 
radical newness of the sovereign is this sacral purpose of empire at the 
core.230 The postmodern sovereign, through war as the rule, promises a 
"return" to the pure or ethical self, but it is the old, imperial self, newly 
consecrated (sacralized). 
The new sovereign engenders hierarchical stability, which resembles 
the stability and obduracy of the stable borders (the dispositif) in another 
way: 
[It is] a machine that creates a continuous call for authority. The machine 
seems to predetermine the exercise of authority and action across the 
entire social space. Every movement is fixed and can seek its own 
designated place only within the system itself, in the hierarchical 
relationship accorded to it. This preconstituted movement defines the 
reality of the process of the imperial constitutionalization of world 
order-the new paradigm.231 
If this rigidity seems antithetical to the self constituted by the sovereign 
state as the site of "deterritorialized and reterritorializing"232 flows of 
desire, consider again the similarity to the disciplinary dispositif: the free 
flows engender the very constraints that channel them; this is the essence of 
the negative liberty here achieved. Naming "corruption" as "the sign of the 
absence of any ontology," Hardt and Negri suggest that 
Imperial sovereignty thrives on the proliferating contradictions corruption 
gives rise to; it is stabilized by its instabilities, by its impurities and 
226 Id. at 24 (quoting Michel Foucault, Les Mailles du Pouvoir, in DITS ET ECRITS 194 (Paris: Gal\imard 
1944)). 
227 There is "an ethico-political dynamic at the heart of is juridical concept" with two fundamental 
elements: "a boundless space" and "all time ... Empire exhausts historical time." Id. at 11. 
228 The "production" of life refers to the power of the sovereign to wage war: "The state as the decisive 
political entity possesses an enormous power: the possibility of waging war and thereby publicly 
disposing of the lives of men. The jus belli contains such a disposition. It implies a double possibility: 
the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill enemies," 
SCHMITT, supra note 71, at 46. 
229 HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30 at 12. 
230 
"(T]he right of the police is legitimated by universal values." Id. at 18. 
231 Id. at 14. 
232 On the erasure of barriers between global and local: 
Id. at 45. 
The better framework, then, to designate the distinction between the global and the local 
might refer to different networks of flows and obstacles in which the local moment or 
perspective gives priority to the reterritorializing barriers or boundaries and the global 
moment privileges the mobility of deterritorializing flows. It is false, in any case, to claim 
that we can (re)establish local identities that are in some sense outside and protected against 
the global flows of capital and Empire. 
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admixture; it is calmed by the panic and anxieties it continually 
engenders. Corruption names the perpetual process of alteration and 
metamorphosis, the anti-foundational foundation, the deontological mode 
ofbeing.~33 
It is to escape from this mode of the modem state, to renounce and 
refuse its "ontological dualism," and to embrace a different kind of 
ontology, a utopia of "love,"234 that sets the anti-imperialist (and 
communist) schema of the postmodern critical project. But the point 
requires the embrace of the "interiorized"235 mechanisms of oppression that 
constitute the sovereign, as well as a refusal of the idea of "immediate" 
sovereignty, that leads to the circularity and reinscription of imperialist 
thinking. To fight sovereign one must be the sovereign; immediation 
becomes its own strength. 
The first embrace is with respect to borders and borderlessness. In a 
section entitled "There Is No More Outside,"236 Hardt and Negri outline 
the various modem and postmodern critiques of the traditional dualities; 
critiques against the them/us, inside/out dichotomies, they suggest, are no 
more than the "blackmail of bourgeois realism."237 The call for the erasure 
of borders implicates the erasure of politics.238 And this is their warning: 
the nature of power has so changed, so inseminated and invested our bodies 
and souls, that there is no mediation between subject and supranational 
power.239 There is no "outside" that is "evil"; to use the theological 
233 Id. at 202. 
234 Id. at 186. 
Spinoza takes on the theoretical challenge to establish full knowledge of truth and discover 
the path of the liberation of the body and the mind, positively, in the absolute .... Spinoza's 
primary objective is the ontological development of the unity of true knowledge and the 
powerful body along with the absolute construction of singular and coJlective immanence 
.... The desire (cupiditas) that rules the course of the existence and action of nature and 
humans is made Jove (amor}-which invests at once both the natural and the divine. 
Id. Hardt & Negri note that Spinoza failed to realize his vision, which resolved in a "search for an 
outside," which "seems to run aground and propose merely phantasms of mysticism, negative intuitions 
of the absolute ... . "Id. 
235 Id. at 23. 
Id. 
The behaviors of social integration and exclusion proper to rule are thus increasingly 
interiorized within the subjects themselves. Power is now exercised through machines that 
directly organize the brains (in communication systems, information networks, etc.) and 
bodies (in welfare systems, monitored activities, etc.) toward a state of autonomous 
alienation from the sense of life and the desire for creativity. 
236 Id. at 186. 
237 Id. at 185. "The power of the modem critique of modernity resides precisely where the blackmail of 
bourgeois realism is refused-in other words, where utopian thought, going beyond the pressures of 
homology that always limit it to what already exists, is given a new constituent form." Id. 
238 Id. at 188-89 (referring to the aforementioned "omni-crisis"). For the proposition that the end of 
politics is the beginning of the polemical, see Alan Wolfe, The New Pamphleteers: When the 
Establishment Disappears, Polemics Fill the Void, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 7 (Book Review), at 13, 
stating: 
Pamphleteering is what happens when no one-editorial writers, university professors, 
publishing executives-is doing much "filtering." Without strong political parties and 
powerful labor unions, Arianna Huffington's and Sean Hannity's politics is the kind of 
politics you get. For all their ugliness of language and unpersuasive fury, then, the current 
crop of political pamphlets bears a striking resemblance to the increasingly democratic 
culture in which they flourish. 
239 HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 30, at 138. 
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language of Volf, we are all sinners. Thus, the critiques of the sovereign in 
terms of porosity and the promise of fusion must be refused. 
Hardt and Negri's post-postmodern project, however, not only calls for 
the acceptance of the sovereign-as-myself as the means of fighting the 
modem state, it does so in a way that reinscribes the sacrality of the 
undertaking. First, sacrality is most evident in this refusal of the 
postmodern project, the renunciation of the reterritorialization of the "I" as 
the singular and autonomous integer of sovereignty, and in the 
promulgation of a messianic figure: the self, really, as Everyman, the 
collective-as-one (an alternative or communitarian reterritorialization). 
This "return to the self' as collective (recall Volf's "brethren in Christ") 
depetrifies the homelessness and isolation of the imperial refugee, filled but 
perdurably emptied by imperial desire. It is a reterritorialization that 
repudiates the negativity of the erotic dispositif. Precisely because the 
return is to the self as constituted by imperial, immediated power,240 the 
return is an "interior" reorganization of borders, an internal 
reconceptualization, indeed recreation, with intimations of a divine agency 
involved. This self, with its synthetic,241 utopic, even religious242 allusions 
(the new, militant, and politicized self is beyond the "refusal" of the 
negative dispositif) is ready to do battle with the system "from within": 
Id. 
Today the militant cannot ever pretend to be a representative, even of the 
fundamental human needs of the exploited. Revolutionary political 
militancy today, on the contrary, must rediscover what has always been its 
proper form: not representational but constituent activity . ... Here is the 
strong novelty of militancy today: it repeats the virtues of insurrectional 
action of two hundred years of subversive experience, but at the same 
time it is linked to a new world, a world that knows no outside. It knows 
only an inside, a vital and ineluctable participation in the set of social 
[I]t is important to investigate the utility of [postmodern and postcolonial] theories in the 
context of the new paradigm of power. This new enemy not only is resistant to the old 
weapons but actually thrives on them, and thus joins its would-be antagonists in applying 
them to the fullest. Long live difference! Down with essentialist binaries! 
240 Id. at 26. "All the intermediary elements of the process have in fact fallen aside, so that the 
legitimacy of the international order can no longer be constructed through mediations but must rather be 
grasped immediately in all its diversity," and further: "This [i.e., Empire] is a radical transformation that 
reveals the unmediated relationship between power and subjectivities, and hence demonstrates both the 
impossible or 'prior' mediations and the uncontainable temporal variability of the event." 
Id. 
241 Id. at 132 (referring to the postcolonial politics of Franz Fanon and Malcolm X). 
Id. 
This open negativity is merely the healthy expression of a real antagonism, a direct relation 
of force. Because it is not the means to a final synthesis, this negativity is not a politics in 
itself; rather, it merely poses a separation .... The real political process of constitution will 
have to take place on this open terrain of forces with a positive logic, separate from the 
dialectics of colonial sovereignty. 
242 Id. at 393. 
The great masses need a material religion of the senses [eine sinnliche Religion]. Not only 
the great masses but also the philosopher needs it. Monotheism of reason and the heart, 
polytheism of the imagination and art, this is what we need .... [W]e must have a new 
mythology, but this mythology must be at the service of ideas. It must be a mythology of 
reason. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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structures, with no possibility of transcending them. . . . This militancy 
makes resistance into counterpower and makes rebellion into a project of 
love.243 
Thus, as the newness of the postmodern sovereign's return to a pure, 
ethical self is really the reconsecration (resacralization) of an old imperial 
self, so also the "novelty" of the postmodern anti-imperialism posited by 
Hard and Negri is a reconsecration of an old militancy of "two hundred 
years of subversive experience," promising "a new world" of unity and the 
transcendence of the individuated self. 
So there we have it: within refusal is the construction of a new mode of 
life, creating "humanity squared";244 reterritorialization, similar to Volf's 
nonexclusionary borders, is the promise of communalism. And while the 
secular open space encountering the code's rigid borders appears radical 
and new (a paradigm shift), the rhetorical register is religious: the 
"constituent" figure (messianic) at the conclusion of Hardt and Negri's 
analysis is Saint Francis of Assisi, patron saint of ascesis. Hardt and Negri 
point to his renunciation of the material world (proto-capitalism) in order to 
use its own captivating and colonizing tools against it. Thus, renunciation 
goes beyond merely an ethics of refusal, a breed of the Negative, to an 
ethics of love and the quest for purity and innocence: St. Francis presents a 
utopian vision of oneness with God, nature, and humankind.245 
But St. Francis, accordin:i§ to legend, received his ethical and 
transcendent calling in dreams. 6 And so we return to the code and the 
fantasy of fusion with which we began. Will either the Christian or the 
secular alternatives fulfill the dream and thereby obviate the cycle of 
abjection, projection, and alienation within which we are steeped as 
discursive subjects of the code? It is not, I submit, a criticism to say that 
despite, or perhaps because of, the radical nature of the alternatives as 
243 Id. at 413. 
244 Id. at 26. 
245 Id. at413. 
Id. 
There is an ancient legend that might serve to illuminate the future life of the communist 
militancy: that of Saint Francis of Assisi. Consider his work. To denounce the poverty of 
the multitude he adopted that common condition and discovered there the ontological power 
of a new society. The communist militant does the same, identifying in the common 
condition of the multitude its enormous wealth. Francis in opposition to nascent capitalism 
refused every instrumental discipline, and in opposition to the mortification of the flesh (in 
poverty and in the constituted order) he posed a joyous life, including all of being and 
nature, the animals, sister moon, brother sun, the birds of the field, the poor and the 
exploited humans, together against the will of power and corrupti9n. Once again in 
postmodernity we find ourselves in Francis's situation, posing against the misery of power 
the joy of being. This is a revolution that no power will control-because biopower and 
communism, cooperation and revolution remain together, in love, simplicity, and also 
innocence. This is the irrepressible lightness and joy of being communist. 
246 See, e.g., PASCHAL ROBINSON, St. Francis of Assisi, in THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOLUME VI, 
available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/0622la.htm (last modified Nov. 3, 2004), stating: 
His biographers tell us that the night before Francis set forth he had a strange dream in 
which he saw a vast hall hung with armor all marked with the Cross. 'These,' said a voice, 
'are for you and your soldiers.' 'I know I shall be a great prince,' exclaimed Francis 
exultingly, as he started for Apulia. But a second illness arrested his course at Spoleto. 
There, we are told, Francis had another dream in which the same voice bade him turn back 
to Assisi. He did so at once. This was 1205. 
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departures from the narrative of stability engendered by the bordered other, 
there is still the insinuation of the normative discourse present in both. On 
the contrary, with the necessity of rupture (transgression), the promise of 
fusion (eroticism as love), and the strong temptation that this promise will 
draw you back into the code, the alternatives have mandated a return to the 
self as the site of self-interrogation.247 
As such, one may ask: is a "neutral space" conceivable at the porous 
borderline? Can the self face its own antagonistic alterity? Precisely at the 
border, we see ourselves in relation to the suffering of others. We pause to 
consider the erotic and sepulchral complicities-political and moral-of 
the juridical discourse as a seductive fantasy248 of innocence. 
V. CONCLUSION: MY ALTERITY 
et le negre chaque }our plus bas, plus /ache, plus sterile, moins profond, 
plus repandu au-dehors, plus separe de soi-meme, plus ruse avec soi-
meme, moins immediat avec soi-meme, 
j'accepte, j'accepte tout cela. 
-Aime Cesaire249 
The postmodern sovereign (defining the United States as superpower, 
or s1Wiranationalism as power beyond the allegedly declining Wes!ghalian 
state 0) denotes a global world as "a new constellation of power." 1 The 
world may seem to be divided between the stable democracies and the 
many smaller, struggling countries where crises flare up. But when, I 
suggest, we go behind that conception of "our" situation vis-a-vis "theirs," 
and when we consider the nature of modem sovereignty as reinforcing the 
suppression of "my alterity" by displacing violence to the chaotic other, we 
247 See KRJSTEVA, supra note 51, at 101. "The return to oneself leads the individual to question his 
truth, much like what is accomplished with philosophical dialogues, for example Plato's. Something 
that prayer and all forms of meditation also accomplish according to St. Augustine." Id. at 100. 
248 For the constructive utility of fantasies of fusion, see FIRESTONE & CATLETT, supra note 68, at 35 
(discussing on the "fantasy bond" created by the child to compensate for the lack of fusion with the 
mother at an early age). 
Id. 
Early in the developmental sequence, the infant or child compensates for emotional 
deprivation by forming the primary defense, which 1 refer to as the fantasy bond . ... The 
fantasy bond, originally an imagined fusion with the mother or primary parenting figure, is 
highly effective as a defense because a human being's capacity for imagination provides 
partial gratification of needs and reduces tension. This leads to a pseudoindependent 
posture, and the more an individual comes to rely on fantasy, the less he or she will seek or 
be able to accept gratification from other people in real relationships. 
249 AIME CESAIRE, CAHIER D'UN RETOUR AU PAYS NATAL 56 (Editions Presence Africaine 1983) (1939). 
The poetic language is idiosyncratic, but loosely translated means, "and each day that the black is 
inferior, mean, barren, stupid, dispersed, the more distant from himself, the more self-deluded, the less 
in touch with himself-I accept, I accept all of that." The play on words-plus, moin, etc.-suggests a 
tension between the pregnancy and the emptiness of the epithets. I am grateful to Robert Blauvelt for 
his insights in the translation of this passage. 
250 See generally TODD, supra note 36, at 6-13. Todd catalogues the work of others who have charted 
this decline (as well as those who suggest the opposite). Included among the "structural anti-
Americans" are Noam Chomsky and Benjamin Barber; those suggesting a "moderate vision" of 
American power and the "inexorable reduction of its power within a world of rising populations and 
economic development" are Paul Kennedy, Samuel Huntington, Zbignew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, 
and Robert Gilpin. See id. at 6-7. 
251 CHARLES KUPCHAN, T.HE VULNERABILITY OF EMPIRE 7 {1994). 
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see the border as less stable than the law's promise of redemption (and with 
it, my ethical action) may connote. 
In this Article I have suggested that there is a link between the larger 
relations of state or national power and the more immediate relation 
between the subject and the other within the ethical discourse. I have 
examined this relationship between the self and other, the ethical "I" and 
the violence outside, as the interplay of various subterranean desires and 
imperatives (discourse on genocide). The discourse is inscribed with our 
investment in the border between self and other; the border enables us to 
see the suffering of the other, to imagine the ethical, and to configure or 
suppress our complex desires and projections. 
The border protects us from confronting those complex desires, but at 
the cost of an encounter with the other in his or her alterity. The border as 
resistance to the encounter is itself invested with a sense of its necessity: to 
maintain security and safety, to ratify my innocence, to legitimate my moral 
stance toward the world, and to secure my power. If it is true that the more 
my power is threatened, and hence the more my walls will be bolstered and 
policed, then since the discourse is only possible with the expulsion 
(exportation) of violence as other-what Hardt and Negri describe as the 
"omni-crisis"-the self will increasingly cleave to a fantasy of safety and 
security2 increasingly find itself, as Cesaire puts it, "plus separe de soi-meme." 52 In its solitude, its ethical address to the other-the instinct of 
love-will engender the replicative corruption of the erotic, specular 
investment in the other's death, its ultimate escape. 
Thus, self-alienation is not only a suppression of self-aggression253 due 
to a frustrated desire for fusion and transcendence, but is also the source of 
the exclusion that creates the very conditions of rule that enable self-
configuration as stable and strong. I have suggested two alternative 
theories for interrupting this narrative of stability, each of which partakes of 
the stable model but requires a return to the self, to its own antagonistic or 
alienated violence in the passionate embrace of self-creation. This is the 
terrifying proposition advanced by both religious and secular altematives-
terrifying because, as Firestone has noted, the resistance to change is 
deeply embedded since the patterns of alienation function, over time, as the 
substitute for a sense of the connectedness that has always seemed, in any 
event, elusive.254 
In short, my question has been: what are we really saying and doing as 
we engage in the semantic debate? What is the meaning of genocide? I 
have discussed the libidinal investments pursuant to the discourse that 
characterize it as a kind of code, and cast the law Uuridical discourse) as a 
vessel producing and containing (or attempting to) a complex of fears, 
252 CESAIRE, supra note 249. 
253 See, e.g., FIRESTONE & CATLETT, supra note 68, at 33 (aggression as derived from frustration). 
254 Id. "The core of resistance is the fear of giving up the primary fantasy and being left feeling alone. 
Even though negative thoughts or voices are destructive, they are a form of companionship, and 
resistance represents a fear of losing that companionship." Id. 
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hopes, frustrations, and desires. The discourse determines the ethical, my 
ethical, self. 
Finally, then, at stake in the "'semantic debate," if we are serious about 
avoiding harm to others, is the potential for reclaiming the erotic from its 
infibulated fixation on death, and reimagining the erotic as the domain of 
love. It requires excavating and confronting the deeply ambivalent desire 
for the destruction of the other as the sign of a will to stability and 
permanence. If we take Cesaire's advice and accept alterity, the horrible 
prospect of mass slaughter and suffering in distant countries will not 
vanish. People have always killed, and they always will. But the 
persuasiveness of a simplified juridical story of genocide as the chaos "out 
there," having nothing to do with me, calling me merely to redemption, 
may become attenuated. What I do, how I see and know the suffering of 
others, matters. And it will matter more as the world grows smaller. 
